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THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE LAW OF HUMAN RESOURCES
Matthew T. Bodie*
Abstract:

This article looks at twelve of the Roberts Court's labor and
employment law cases through the lens of human resources. The rise
of HR departments parallels the increase in the myriad statutory and
regulatory requirements that govern the workplace. The Supreme
Court's decisions in labor and employment law cases are largely
monitored and implemented by HR professionals who must carry out
these directives on a daily basis. In adopting an approach that is
solicitous towards human resources, the Roberts Court reflects a
willingness to empower these private institutional players. Even if
labor and employment law scholars do not agree with the
solicitousness, they should use the opportunity to develop a positive
theory of HR, one that directs this workforce in a just and ethical
manner.
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“People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA plans.”1

INTRODUCTION
Most of the sturm and drang in employment law involves issues
related to litigation. In particular, issues of procedure—motions to
dismiss, summary judgment, pleading standards, and class actions—
take up much of the intellectual space within the field. For example,
in the employment discrimination context, the most prominent cases
concern the burdens of production and persuasion,2 the standards for
mixed motive evidence,3 and the availability of punitive damages and
attorney’s fees.4 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 focused almost entirely
on litigation-related concerns, much of it in response to prior Supreme
Court decisions;5 similarly, the recent amendments to the Americans
with Disabilities Act are also litigation-oriented.6
And perhaps the
most important employment discrimination case of the decade
concerned the certification of a class of employees.7 In the ERISA
Conkwright v. Frommert, 130 S.Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
3 Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
4 Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 545 (1999) (setting forth the test for
punitive damages).
5 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (providing for jury
trials, compensatory damages, and a different litigation standard for disparate
impact cases). See also Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 530 (2003) (arguing that the 1991 Act
“explicitly rejected” the Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 642 (1989)).
6 Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217
(2008) (discussing how definitional changes will change the litigation landscape).
7 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
1
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context, much of the case law concerns the standards of review8 and
the availability of certain causes of action.9 And all of the fencing back
and forth about employment arbitration is largely about procedurerelated issues such as class actions10 and the scope of arbitral review.11
Of course, for all this focus on litigation, most employment
disputes never go to trial.12 But beyond the formally settled claims lies
an unknown but likely vast number of employment-related disputes
that are never even filed. In order to deal with these disputes, as well
as to manage the employment relationship more generally, most large
employers rely on human resource professionals.13 Human resources –
or “HR” – is the term for the business function tasked with handling
the myriad issues that arise from the dealings between employees,
supervisors, management, and the firm. Although the term “human
resources” dates from the 1960s, it is based on a tradition of employee
management dating back to the industrial revolution.14
HR
departments are tasked with managing the details of the employment
relationship: recruitment, hiring, compensation, benefit management,
training, and dispute resolution.15 Ever increasingly, the job of the HR
professional is to manage legal compliance within these areas.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc., 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
10 ATT Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
11 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct.2772 (2010).
12 It is well established that most employment claims that are filed nevertheless
settle out of court. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
440 (2004) (stating that almost 70% of employment discrimination cases settle out of
court); Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confidential
Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111, 135 (finding
that in a dataset of 472 employment discrimination cases before a federal magistrate
judge, settlement was reached prior to the making of a dispositive motion in 87% of
the cases).
13 See DAVID J. CHERRINGTON, THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 5 (4th ed.
1995) (“Most companies with over 300 employees have a human resource manager”).
14 Sandford M. Jacoby, A Century of Human Resources Management , in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS TO HUMAN RESOURCES AND BEYOND: THE EVOLVING PROCESS OF
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS MANAGEMENT 147, 148 (Bruce E. Kaufman, Richard A.
Beumont & Roy B. Helfgott eds., 2003).
15 See, e.g., SHAWN SMITH & REBECCA MAZIN, THE HR ANSWER BOOK: AN
INDISPENSABLE GUIDE FOR MANAGERS AND HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONALS xi-xii
(2004).
8
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HR employees often have a bad reputation for enforcing needless
rules, focusing on trivial matters, and having a vindictive streak
against their fellow employees.16 However, looking at its small but
important pool of labor and employment decisions, the Supreme Court
under Chief Justice John Roberts has shown a special solicitude for HR
departments. The Roberts Court has recognized that most of the
employment law dramas play out in the private sector well short of
litigation. Given the number of employees, and the expanding legal
standards for employees set down by employment law, it would be
impossible for courts to resolve these disputes en masse. As a result,
private actors must be counted up to do the ground-floor work of
addressing workplace compliance. Thus, the Court may be looking to
enlist and empower this powerful wing of human resources
professionals to manage workplace issues more quickly and effectively.
In so doing, the Court is following the general trend of
privatization and governance reform that is alive and well in
employment law. Although most employment law remains regulatory
in nature, scholars and practitioners have increasingly pointed to
public-private partnerships, as well as so-called self-regulation, to help
overcome the enforcement gap in employment law.17 A self-governance
approach has most obviously been used in the OSHA context, where
the law specifically accommodates private compliance mechanisms. 18
But self-governance approaches, coming in many shapes and sizes,
See, e.g., Stewart J. Schwab, Studying Labor Law and Human Resources in Rhode
Island, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 384, 384 (2002) ("Human-relations
16

professionals are sometimes said to be hypocrites giving a fake smile to employees
while looking solely at the bottom line."); Keith H. Hammonds, Why We Hate HR,
FAST
COMPANY,
Aug.
1,
2005,
at:
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/97/open_hr.html
(“Why
are
annual
performance appraisals so time-consuming -- and so routinely useless? Why is HR so
often a henchman for the chief financial officer, finding ever-more ingenious ways to
cut benefits and hack at payroll? Why do its communications -- when we can
understand them at all -- so often flout reality? Why are so many people processes
duplicative and wasteful, creating a forest of paperwork for every minor transaction?
And why does HR insist on sameness as a proxy for equity?”).
17 See, e.g., CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELFREGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought , 89 MINN. L.
REV. 342 (2004).
18 Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance of
Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1104-15 (2005) (describing OSHA’s new
governance regulatory programs).
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have spread across the employment landscape. They generally seek to
pair private efforts to enforce the law with some system of
accountability, whether through reconfigured governmental scrutiny or
non-governmental third parties, such as NGOs or unions. The critical
question about these efforts is where they fall on the spectrum: are
they meaningful efforts that lead to greater compliance, or are they
merely window dressing? The Roberts Court has demonstrated more
comfort with a traditional form of private regulation: namely, internal
enforcement by HR and compliance departments. By enlisting private
compliance actors, the Court is looking to leverage its authority across
a much wider set of firms than would be possible with a litigation
focus. Through its holdings, its inferences, and its dicta, the Court can
move these departments to enforce the law at the front lines, well
before outside counsel must be called in. Litigation fades into the
background. It becomes the shadow in which the actual stuff of
employment law takes place.19
Of course, it is impossible to know what the Supreme Court – an
assemblage of nine20 individuals – actually intend with their slate of
opinions, beyond what those opinions themselves say. But looking at
the areas of employment discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and
ERISA, I contend that the Roberts Court has focused more on the role
of human resources departments than on the role of litigation in
enforcing the employment laws. The Court’s decisions have not been
uniformly pro-defendant, but they have been fairly uniform in
promoting the importance of HR professionals and other private
compliance actors in managing the enforcement of the law. This
concern for private compliance cuts across the other labels, such as
judicially modest or conservative or pro-business, that have been
applied to the Roberts Court.
Moreover, these decisions call into questions our notions about
the political economy of employment law. In the area of criminal
justice, scholars such as William Stuntz and Eric Miller have
questioned the resource allocation driven by traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence; instead of focusing on rights, they argue (to
Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
19

The Roberts Court is actually eleven justices: the current nine justices (Chief
Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Ginsburg, Alito,
Sotomayor, and Kagan), as well as former Justices Souter & Stevens.
20
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paraphrase them bluntly), we should focus on cops. 21 The Roberts
Court’s employment law decisions counsel for a similar reorientation of
perspective: instead of focusing on employment law rights, we should
focus on HR professionals. Like cops on the beat, human resources
departments can address problems at a grass-roots level. And if we
assume their bad faith, we miss the opportunity to enlist them in the
fight.
This Article will describe the Supreme Court’s focus on human
resources and inquire as to how even progressive employment law
scholars can engage with this focus in a way that will improve the lives
of workers. Part I of the Article provides a background on HR
management as a field and explains its role in the workplace today.
Part II discusses how the Court has crafted its employment law
decisions in the areas of discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and
ERISA towards the HR departments that have the front-line
responsibilities for administering these laws. Finally, Part III will
discuss how the political economy of workplace regulation should be
driving all participants—even progressive employment law scholars—
to envision how to enlist HR managers and employees to carry out the
dictates of employment law in their everyday work.
I.

LAW AND THE RISE OF HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

The law is not unfamiliar to the world of the workplace. Prior to
the New Deal, agency and contract law dictated the terms of the
employment relationship, which changed from primarily year-long
contracts during Blackstone’s era into the “at-will” rule during the late
19th Century.22 Federal law then imposed its own framework with
statutory schemes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),23
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),24 Title VII of the 1964 Civil

William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 780 (2006); Eric J. Miller, The Warren Court's Regulatory Revolution in
Criminal Procedure, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2010).
22 For a discussion of how the at-will rule developed from an early misapprehension
of the actual state of the law, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
23 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006).
24 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. (2006)
21
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Rights Act,25 the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 26 and
the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA). 27 States
have piggy-backed off these regimes in some areas, such as
antidiscrimination protections;28 they have also partnered with the
federal government (for unemployment insurance)29 and have
established their own unique protections (such as workers’
compensation).30 Thus, despite the at-will rule (or perhaps because of
it),31 the workplace has become a very legally-intensive environment.
In grappling with the study of the law of work, legal education
has generally broken down this subject area into four distinct
subsections: labor law, employment discrimination, employee benefits,
and employment law.32 Labor law concerns the regulation of collective
employee action, largely manifested though union representation.33
Employment discrimination focuses on the federal antidiscrimination
statutes, while employee benefits centers around the tax and benefits
implications of ERISA.34 Finally, employment law focuses on the
employment contract and a grab-bag of other regulatory provisions,
including FLSA, OSHA, covenants not to compete, employee privacy,
and workers compensation.35 These subjects are the lenses through
which judges, law professors, and attorneys look at the workplace.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (2006).
27 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
and 29 U.S.C.).
28 See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney Supp. 2012) (setting forth unlawful
discriminatory practices and protected classes); id. §§ 297-98 (reviewing the
administrative and judicial processes for discrimination complaints).
29 See Charles C. Kearns, State Implementation of the SUTA Dumping Prevention
Act of 2004, 11 ST. & LOC. TAX LAW. 105, 107-08 (2006).
30 See, e.g., JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN,
DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004); Lawrence M.
Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, in
AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 279
(Lawrence M. Freidman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978).
31 See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More With Less , 68 MD. L.
REV. 89, 89-93 (2008) (arguing that the current regime of at-will plus exceptions
should be replaced with a uniform and easier-to-administer rule based on just cause).
32 See Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1539
(2006).
25
26

Id.
Id.
35 Id.
33
34
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Perhaps not surprisingly, at least three of the four also
represent somewhat distinct practice areas. Labor law is the realm of
union-side and management-side attorneys, as well as the network of
government employees and private arbitrators that work to keep the
collective bargaining machinery running.
However, with the
percentage of union-represented workers continuing to shrink, this
field is a much thinner version of its former self. 36 In contrast, the
growth in employment discrimination suits has spurred significant
growth in the plaintiff and defense bar in this area. Particularly
important was the 1991 Civil Rights Act, which amped up the
economic incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring discrimination
actions.37 Employee benefits forms an expanding niche within tax
departments. Only employment law has failed to catch on as a unique
subspecialty. Some aspects of the “employment law” ubercategory,
such as workers compensation, are attended to by a special set of
lawyers.38 Others are subsumed into larger categories, such as
business litigation or corporate law.
Plaintiff-side employment
discrimination attorneys have begun to take off some pieces of
employment law, such as FLSA wage and hour litigation. Finally,
some employment law matters, such as unemployment insurance
claims, are largely handled pro se.
Given that legal education is designed to educate attorneys, it is
no surprise that the legal world has focused on the role of law and,
more specifically, attorneys within the workplace. However, as the
role of law has expanded beyond its common-law parameters, the task
of interacting with the law has too expanded beyond attorneys and
litigation. In fact, at the grass-roots level, human resources employees
are much more likely to deal with day-to-day workplace legal issues
See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002) (discussing the gradual but dramatic decrease in privatesector union representation).
37 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity , 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 277, 279 (noting that “[t]he 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964
attracted to the practice of employment law a new generation of lawyers, who
approach employment litigation like personal injury cases”).
38 See, e.g., Marc J. Cairo, Five Things Every Lawyer Should Know About Workers’
Compensation Practice, CHICAGO BAR J. 50 , 51, April 2004 (“Traditionally,
practitioners in this area of law have been few and attorneys from both sides of the
bar know each other very well. The result is an adversarial but congenial
community.”).
36
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than are in-house counsels or outside law firms. Human resources,
training, and labor relations managers and specialists held about
904,900 jobs in 2008.39 And the numbers are expected to grow. As the
Bureau of Labor Statistics reports:
Employment is expected to grow much faster than the
average for all human resources, training, and labor
relations managers and specialists occupations. . . .
Overall employment is projected to grow by 22 percent
between 2008 and 2018, much faster than the average for
all occupations. Legislation and court rulings revising
standards in various areas—occupational safety and
health, equal employment opportunity, wages, healthcare,
retirement plans, and family leave, among others—will
increase demand for human resources, training, and labor
relations experts. Rising healthcare costs and a growing
number of healthcare coverage options should continue to
spur demand for specialists to develop creative
compensation and benefits packages that companies can
offer prospective employees. Employment of labor
relations staff, including arbitrators and mediators,
should grow as companies attempt to resolve potentially
costly labor-management disputes out of court. Additional
job growth may stem from increasing demand for
specialists in international human resources management
and human resources information systems.40
Thus, there now exists a large cadre of human resources employees
who are tasked, in large part, with managing the relationship between
the firm and its employees.
The Society for Human Resource
Management (SHRM) boasts a global membership of over 250,000 and
a staff of more than 350.41

BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HUMAN RESOURCES, TRAINING, AND LABOR
RELATIONS MANAGERS AND SPECIALISTS,” OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK, 201011 ed., at: http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos021.htm.
39

40

Id.

Mission and History, Society for Human Resource
http://www.shrm.org/about/history/Pages/default.aspx.
41

Management,

at:
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Concomitant with this growth in employment opportunities,
human resources management has developed into an academic and
professional field of endeavor.42 The beginnings of human resources
are frequently associated with the work of Frederick Taylor, who in the
late 19th Century sought to bring “scientific management” to the
industrial workplace.43 “Taylorism,” as his approach came to be called,
involved breaking down workplace tasks into their smallest possible
unit, and then creating rigorous protocols for these tasks so as to
maximize efficiency. Taylor intended for his system to eliminate
conflict between workers and management by applying natural law to
determine the “one best way” to address production issues.44 However,
human resources might be better seen as a response to Taylorism—an
effort to put the “human factor” back into focus.45 This focus—often
paired with the monikers of “human relations” or “personnel
management”—agreed with Taylor’s
perspective that poor
management practices were ultimately at fault for the rift between
management and labor.46
Thus, it was the responsibility of
management to develop programs and practices to address the
workers’ needs.47 In contrast with the “rational actor” in economics,
the field of personnel management used psychology to look at workers
from a social perspective.48 The result was an outpouring of books and
As a recent president of the Society of Human Resource Management (SHRM) said,
“Perhaps the greatest human resources accomplishment . . . has been the worldwide
recognition that human resources management is, indeed, a profession with a clearly
defined body of knowledge.” Michael R. Losey, Mastering the Competencies of HR
Management, 38 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 99, 99-100 (1999).
43 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory Management: An
Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 983 (1998). See also
Frederick Taylor, A Piece Rate System, Being a Step toward Partial Solution of the
Labor Problem, 16 TRANSACTIONS 856 (1895). Taylor was perhaps the most
prominent members of the “systematic management” movement between 1880 and
1920. Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 148.
44 BRUCE E. KAUFMAN, THE ORIGINS & EVOLUTION OF THE FIELD OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1993).
45 Id. at 24; see also GORDON S. WATKINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LABOR
PROBLEMS 476-77 (1922) (“The old scientific management failed because it was not
founded upon a full appreciation of the importance of the human factor. It was left to
the new science of personnel management to discover and evaluate the human
elements in production and distribution.”).
46 KAUFMAN, supra note BK1993, at 25.
42

47
48

Id.
Id.
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articles in the 1920s from psychologists and business practitioners
about the needs and wants of the modern employee.49 At the same
time, thousands of companies were setting up or expanding their
employment management departments to take advantage of these
developments.50 A new field was taking shape.51
As the ability of workers to organize collectively reached a
crescendo in the 1930s, both through continued union growth and
through federal protections such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act52 and
the 1935 Wagner Act,53 the field of personnel management drew
competition from an “institutional labor economics” (ILE) approach.54
ILE advocates, found within the more general field of industrial
relations, argued that collective bargaining was a crucial element to
labor relations, and that management practices in and of themselves
were not a sufficient solution.55 This led to what has been described as
a “bifurcation” in the field of workplace management.56 Within
academia, economics and, later, industrial relations departments
offered courses in “labor problems” that primarily focused on collective
bargaining.57 In contrast, business schools offered courses in personnel
management that focused on such managerial tasks as recruitment,
promotion, compensation, and training.58 In the field, labor relations
specialists were now joining with existing personnel departments, and
attorneys were often called in to negotiate and manage collective
bargaining agreements.
Id. Ordway Tead and Henry Metlcalf authored the first university textbook
devoted to personnel management in 1920. Bruce E. Kaufman, Evolution and
Current Status of University HR Programs, 38 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 103, 104
(1999).
50 Id. at 103. See also Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 151 (“Between 1915 and 1920,
the proportion of firms with more than 250 employees that had personnel
departments increased from roughly 5 percent to about 25 percent.”).
51 See id. (noting that the first national conference of personnel managers attracted
five hundred attendees in 1917, and close to three thousand came In 1920).
52 Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
53 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151169).
54 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 104.
55 John R. Commons has been called the “exemplar” of the ILE approach. See id.;
JOHN R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL GOODWILL (1919); JOHN R. COMMONS, INDUSTRIAL
GOVERNMENT (1921).
56 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 104.
49

57
58

Id.
Id.
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From the post-World War II period up through the 1970s, labor
relations and collective bargaining experts overshadowed their
personnel management counterparts, particularly in academia.59 Over
two dozen schools developed industrial relations programs or
departments, with most of these focused on ILE rather than personnel
management.60 In law, the labor law course was the only workplaceoriented class, and was taught by well-known academics such as Derek
Bok, Archibald Cox, and Clyde Summers.61 Personnel management
courses remained in the curriculum of business schools, but they were
generally not held in high regard.62 In particular, critics argued that
personnel management had a thin foundation in theory and was
almost vocational in its approach to its subject.63
At the same time, however, the field of human relations was
booming in the workplace. The American Society for Personnel
Administration was founded in 1948 with only 28 original members; by
1964, it had grown to over 3,000. The Hawthorne experiments—
conducted at a Western Electric plant in the 1930s—were popularized
in a 1941 Reader’s Digest article, and served as the basis for a new
approach to the study of human relations.64 Over time, the field both
fueled and was fueled by a relationship with the behavioral sciences,
particularly organizational psychology.65 Academic research led to onthe-job developments such as vertical job loading, sensitivity training,
and the managerial grid.66 By the late 1960s, the academic focus of

Id. at 105.
Id.
61 See Bernard Dunau, Book Review: Labor Law: Cases, Materials, and Problems , 71
59
60

COLUM. L. REV. 513 (1971) (discussing labor law casebooks, including those by Bok,
Cox, and Summers).
62 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 105. The 1959 Gordon-Howell report on business
schools was particularly scathing: “Next to the course on production, perhaps more
educational sins have been committed in the name of personnel management than in
any other required course in the business curriculum.” ROBERT A. GORDON & JAMES
E. HOWELL, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR BUSINESS 189 (1959).
63 Fred K. Foulkes, The Expanding Role of the Personnel Function, 53 HARV. BUS.
REV. 71, April 1975.
64 See F.J. Roethlisberger, The Hawthorne Experiments, in CLASSICS OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT 16, 16-17 (Thomas H. Patten, Jr. ed., 1979).
65 Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 158.
66

Id.
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human resources studies had moved from economics to psychology, and
from a more theoretical focus to a much more applied perspective.67
Although collective bargaining remained the dominant
workplace paradigm for academia well into the 1970s, the seeds of its
downfall had been put in place by then. Union density had begun its
long, steady descent. And the clutch of employment laws passed
between 1964 and 1974 established the legal framework for an
employment law, rather than a labor law, approach to workplace
issues.68 As a result, the center of gravity for most workplace issues
became HR departments, rather than the collective bargaining table or
private contract. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, employers took up
a variety of new approaches with zest: total quality management and
quality of work life programs; participatory management; and diversity
programs.69 At the same time, the shift to a finance and shareholderprimacy focus within the boardroom forced HR departments to defend
their positions by showing how good HR policies could increase firm
value.70 The result was the growth of “strategic human resources
management,” which seeks to identify ways in which HR can work
with other business units to increase the firm’s overall business
success.71
The new focus on HR strategy explains in part why the field has
remained firmly ensconced in business schools and is largely missing
from legal academia. Courses on HR or personnel management are
now found in nearly every university with some type of business or
management program.72 Despite some efforts to bring HR back into

Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 106. See also Mitchell Langbert, Professors,
Managers, and Human Resource Education, 39 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 65, 66
67

(2000) (“Because HRM is interdisciplinary and practice-based, human resource
professors tend to be practice-oriented.”).
68 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 107.
69 Id.; Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 164-67.
70 Id. at 165.
71 For an overview of strategic human resources management as an academic
approach, see Christopher Mabey, Graeme Salaman & John Storey, Strategic Human
Resource Management: The Theory of Practice and the Practice of Theory , in
STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A READER (Christopher Mabey, Graeme
Salaman & John Storey eds., 1998). The core concept of strategic human resources
management is that people management can be a “key source of sustained
competitive advantage.” Id.
72 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 107-08.
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the more theoretical realm of economics,73 the field as a whole remains
immersed in organization behavior and focused on subfields such as
employee recruitment, compensation, and training.74 As a result, the
academic discipline is criticized for its “dearth of intellectually
substantive content” in certain areas,75 as well as “an institutional,
and somewhat chatty literature.”76 On the professional side, human
resources employees have struggled to establish themselves as
professionals and important firm players. The field does not have the
strict accreditation requirements that professions such as law,
medicine, or engineering impose.77 Moreover, while HR professionals
often see themselves as part of management, they must often stand
apart from management in order to do their role properly. This
division—being part of the managerial class and yet also separate from
it—has led to the somewhat schizophrenic approach that the field can
sometimes display.78
Given the overlap between the mandate of HR departments and
the extensive network of legal regulations for the workplace, it remains
puzzling that law and HR have remained, as professions, somewhat
distant cousins. While legal education has classes on the exact same
laws with which HR departments must grapple, those classes are
One example has been the push for “personnel economics,” which applies
economics principles (largely from labor economics) to human resources decision. See
EDWARD P. LAZEAR, PERSONNEL ECONOMICS FOR MANAGERS 1 (1998) (“Personnel is
now a science that provides detailed and unambiguous answers to the issues that
trouble managers today.”).
74 Kaufman, supra note BK1999, at 108.
73

75

Id.

LAZEAR, supra note ED1998, at vii. See also id. at 1 (“Until recently, there has
been no systematic discipline on which to base human resources decisions.”).
77 Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 147 (“[P]ersonnel managers, unlike engineers or
accountants, have never really developed an intellectually consistent paradigm for
asserting their professional legitimacy.”).
78 Id. at 148 (“[P]ersonnel managers are in an ambiguous social role—between
employees and line managers—causing them to be distrusted by both sides.”); see
also Richard A. Beaumont, Carlton D. Becker & Sydney R. Robertson, HR Today and
Tomorrow: Organizational Strategies in Global Companies, in Kaufman, Beaumont
& Helfgott, supra note KBH2003, at 416 (“HR needs to work out if and when it needs
to be an employee advocate, the conscience of the institution, provoker of modified
managerial behaviors, a sociological soothsayer predicting the effects of external
forces on business, or some combination of these.”). Cf. LAZEAR, supra note EF1998,
at 1 (“Human resources professional are often treated as if they were the lowest form
of managerial life.”).
76
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generally taught from the perspective of litigation, using the case
method.79 HR departments are often conceived as, at best, wellmeaning but ineffectual bureaucrats or, at worst, an employer’s tool for
evading the spirit and/or the letter of the law with the least adverse
consequences.80 On the HR side, the field does not want to conceive of
itself as a mere mechanism for legal compliance. Instead, it seeks to
generate its own methodological approach, while at the same time
tailoring this approach to actual workplace concerns. In fact, HR
academics have argued that legal mandates should not be the focus of
the field; rather, HR departments should take a more holistic approach
that looks at potential legal ramifications as one aspect to be
understood and managed.81
Both law and human resources share one important professional
trait in common with most other professions: they have a commitment
to professional ethics within the field.82 Although HR lacks the
equivalent of a bar to enforce rules of professional responsibility, the
field is seeking to develop ethical norms and practices that will guide
its membership. SHRM has its own code of ethics relating to
professional
responsibility,
professional
development, ethical
leadership, conflicts of interest, and use of information.83 Academics
have also written on HR ethics, focusing on the role of HR manager
within the firm but also as a professional.84 In fact, some HR scholars
have questioned whether the field’s focus on the management
For a discussion of the contrasting pedagogical styles between law and HR classes,
see Schwab, supra note SJS2002, at 385-88.
80 Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 964-65 (1999)
(discussing how employers and defense lawyers may render an appearance of
nondiscrimination even when discrimination is present).
81 Mark V. Roehling & Patrick M. Wright, Organizationally Sensible versus LegallyCentric Approaches to Employment Decisions, 45 HUMAN RESOURCES MGMT. 605,
606 (2006); see id. at 608 (defining legal-centric decision making as “decision making
that does not involve legal requirements (i.e., a specific course of action is not strictly
mandated by law) but gives primacy to legal considerations to the extent that other
organizationally relevant, nonlegal considerations are essentially ignored.” (emphasis
in original)).
82 Losey, supra note JL1999, at 100 (“Like other recognized professions, human
resources management has its own set of ethical standards.”).
83 Code of Ethics, SHRM, at: http://www.shrm.org/about/Pages/code-of-ethics.aspx.
84 See, e.g., HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ETHICS (John R. Deckop ed., 2006); THE
ETHICS OF HUMAN RESOURCES AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (John W. Budd & James
G. Scoville eds., 2005).
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perspective is the proper orientation, given the many stakeholders
within the firm.85 As a relatively young field, HR has the potential for
a significant amount of professional growth and development.

II.

EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS UNDER THE ROBERTS COURT

The Roberts Court has had a brief time – roughly five years – to
make its mark. Its mark in employment law has already been fairly
significant. What follows is a brief discussion of a number of the
Roberts Court’s employment law cases in the categories of employment
discrimination, retaliation, privacy, and ERISA. In these areas, the
Court has shown a proclivity for considering the ramifications of their
decisions on human resources employees as well as lawyers and
litigants.

A.

Discrimination

Federal protections against discrimination have proved to be the
most influential of the federal workplace statutory schemes. The
primary federal antidiscrimination statutes are Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which protects against discrimination based on
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion and sex;86
the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), which prohibits
discrimination based on age;87 the Americans with Disabilities Act

See, e.g., THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION: WHY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST
MATTERS (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2006); Karen Legge, The Morality
of HRM, in Mabey, Salaman & Storey, supra note MSS1998, at 18, 18 (“When
reading accounts of HRM practice in the UK and North America, it is noticeable the
extent to which the data are (literally) the voice of management.”); Mary E. Graham
& Lindsay M. Tarbell, The Importance of the Employee Perspective in the
Competency Development of Human Resource Professionals , 45 HUMAN RESOURCES
MGMT. 337, 338 (2006) (arguing that HR has to recognize its management-oriented
focus and consider alternative stakeholder perspectives, particularly the employee
perspective).
86 42 U.S.C. §§2000e—2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
Section 1981 provides
protections in and out of the workplace against racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. §
1981.
87 29 U.S.C. §§ 621—634 (2006).
85
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(ADA), which protects disabled workers;88 and the Equal Pay Act,
which prohibits disparate compensation between employees because of
differences in their sexes.89 In terms of enforcement, all of these
statutes focus on private causes of action brought by the victims of
discrimination. Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
prototype for antidiscrimination causes of action, supplies the primary
definition of conduct rendered unlawful by the Act: “to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”90 In order to pursue a claim based on a § 703
violation, the claimant must file a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.91 This filing process belies the largely
private nature of most claims, as the EEOC generally provides “right
to sue” letters allowing the claimant to bring a private right of action.
The EEOC still litigates a small but significant number of claims
which it has deemed to have merit.92 But for the vast majority of
claimants, the EEOC plays no screening function, and they must use
their own resources to bring suit.93
The world of Title VII litigation was transformed by the 1991
Civil Rights Act.94 In addition to changing the standards for mixed
motives cases and discriminatory impact claims, the 1991 Act provided
for juries, compensatory damages, and punitive damages in Title VII
cases.95 These changes dramatically shifted the economics of potential
claims. Instead of appearing before a judge to seek only back pay and
reinstatement, Title VII plaintiffs could be heard by a jury and were
entitled to damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and the
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101—12213 (2006).
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
91 A claimant may instead file a charge with a state civil right agency which has a
“work-sharing” agreement with with EEOC under § 706(c) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5 (2006); Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); EEOC v. Commercial
Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
92 See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002).
93 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 1063 (3d ed. 2008) (“The EEOC plays no
screening function.”).
94 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
95 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(b) (2006) (compensatory and punitive damages), id. § 1977A(c)
(jury trial).
88
89
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malice of the defendant. The increase in potential remuneration
attracted a new set of attorneys, who could build practices on these
more lucrative cases.96
Not surprisingly, Supreme Court decisions and scholarly
commentary have focused on litigation-oriented concerns when it
comes to the enforcement of Title VII. Considerable time and attention
has been paid to fleshing out the basics as to who can bring a Title VII
claim, what they need to prove to survive motions to dismiss and
summary judgment, and what damages they are entitled to receive.
The Court’s decision in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green,97 which
established the requirements for a prima facie case under Title VII,
has been cited in over 41,000 cases.98 Despite the depth of precedent
that the Roberts Court inherited when it comes to Title VII litigation,
the work continues, even when it comes to basic questions such as the
standard of proof.99
In the cases of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth100 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,101 the Rehnquist Court created an
affirmative defense for Title VII defendants. That affirmative defense
paved the way for a legally-sanctioned approach to internal humanresources policies. In both cases, supervisors had subjected the
plaintiffs to hostile work environments, and the Court needed to
determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for the actions
of its supervisors.102 The Court found that liability did attach to the
employer when the supervisor had immediate (or higher) authority
over the employee. At the same time, however, the Court allowed for
employers to raise an affirmative defense to such liability. In order to
maintain the defense, employers needed to meet two elements: “(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
Sturm, supra note SS 2002, at 279.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
98 See Westlaw Keycite search for all cases citing McDonnell-Douglas v. Green on
March 17, 2013.
99 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (holding that a
mixed-motives jury instruction is never proper in ADEA case).
100 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
101 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
102 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754.
96
97
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otherwise.”103 The Court provided further specifics as to reasonable
behavior under these circumstances might mean:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an
antiharassment policy with complaint procedure is not
necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need
for a stated policy suitable to the employment
circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any
case when litigating the first element of the defense. And
while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm
is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use
any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a
demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of
the defense. 104

Faragher and Ellerth provided the cornerstone for a new HRoriented approach to sexual harassment disputes.105 The Court’s
Faragher opinion specifically justified the new defense as a way of
addressing harassment outside of the litigation process:
Although Title VII seeks to make persons whole for
injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination, its primary objective, like that of any
statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to
provide redress but to avoid harm. As long ago as 1980,
the EEOC, charged with the enforcement of Title VII,
adopted regulations advising employers to “take all steps
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as ... informing employees of their right to raise and
how to raise the issue of harassment,” and in 1990 the
EEOC issued a policy statement enjoining employers to
Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807-08.
105 See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form
over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 17 (2003)
(noting that “[n]ews of the Faragher and Ellerth decisions spread quickly through the
103
104

world of human resources” and “human resources consultants found themselves in
high demand”).
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establish a complaint procedure “designed to encourage
victims of harassment to come forward [without
requiring] a victim to complain first to the offending
supervisor.” It would therefore implement clear statutory
policy and complement the Government's Title VII
enforcement efforts to recognize the employer's
affirmative obligation to prevent violations and give credit
here to employers who make reasonable efforts to
discharge their duty. Indeed, a theory of vicarious liability
for misuse of supervisory power would be at odds with the
statutory policy if it failed to provide employers with some
such incentive.106

Faragher and Ellerth thus marked an explicit doctrinal structure
tailored toward the human resources machinery existing within many
workplaces.
By providing guidance on how to manage hostile
workplace and harassment complaints internally, the Court set up a
system of private enforcement that would precede and shape the
litigation process. Employers would have an incentive to create such
processes, and employees would benefit from having their claims
resolved earlier and with less time and expense.
The Roberts Court has followed the lead of Faragher and Ellerth
in tailoring an approach to discrimination that caters to the HR
approach. In Ricci v. DeStefano,107 the Court dealt with an intriguing
set of facts, in which one side’s faith in fair process is set against the
other side’s concern with unjust results. It involves firefighters – a
profession with a sterling reputation for acting in the public good, but
at the same time an ugly history of racial exclusion.108 Justice
Sotomayor – who came up for confirmation right after the decision was
handed down – had authored the opinion that the Court overturned.109
Despite its notoriety, however, the Court’s opinion in Ricci rests on
more moderate premises: namely, the proper process for using race in
judging the results of promotional examinations. In its exegesis of the
proper process, the Court is careful to respect the process that went
106

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 805-06 (quotations and citations omitted).

557 U.S. 557 (2009).
Id. at 610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Firefighting is a profession in which the
legacy of racial discrimination casts an especially long shadow.”).
109 Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
107
108
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into the test: namely, the creation and administration of the test by
human resources professionals.
In Ricci, white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter sued
New Haven and its officials, alleging that the city violated Title VII by
refusing to certify results of promotional examination. New Haven had
commissioned the examination in order to create a pool of potential
candidates for the rank of lieutenant and captain.110 The city paid
Industrial/Organizational Solutions, Inc. (IOS), an HR consulting
company, $100,000 to create the test.111 The Court described the
process in some detail. It discussed how IOS had studied the
firefighters’ jobs by interviewing current lieutenants and captains and
by riding along with on-duty officers.112 It described how IOS
developed multiple choice and oral examinations based on an extensive
set of training materials as well as job-analysis information.113 The
Court also explained how the tests were evaluated.114
In its
explication of the process, the Court emphasized how the materials
were designed to be free from racially discriminatory impact.115
The tests were challenged after white and Hispanic candidates,
but no African-American candidates, qualified for the next set of
available positions.116 After a series of meetings and testimony from a
variety of perspectives, the city’s civil service review board voted not to
certify the results of the test. The city defended its decision based on
its concern about the discriminatory impact of the test results. It
Ricci, 557 U.S at 564-65.
Id. at 564.
112 Id. at 564-65 (“IOS representatives interviewed incumbent captains and
110
111

lieutenants and their supervisors. They rode with and observed other on-duty
officers. Using information from those interviews and ride-alongs, IOS wrote jobanalysis questionnaires and administered them to most of the incumbent battalion
chiefs, captains, and lieutenants in the Department.”).
113 Id. at 565 (“For each test, IOS compiled a list of training manuals, Department
procedures, and other materials to use as sources for the test questions.”).
114 Id. (“IOS assembled a pool of 30 assessors who were superior in rank to the
positions being tested. . . . IOS trained the panelists for several hours on the day
before it administered the examinations, teaching them how to score the candidates'
responses consistently using checklists of desired criteria.”).
115 Id. (noting that IOS “oversampled minority firefighters to ensure that the results
. . . would not unintentionally favor white candidates” and “sixty-six percent of the
[evaluation] panelists were minorities, and each of the nine three-member
assessment panels contained two minority members”).
116 Id. at 566-67.
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argued that had the results been certified, African-American
firefighters could have sued the city for violating Title VII’s prohibition
on hiring decision with a discriminatory impact.117 However, the white
and Hispanic firefighters who had been in line for the promotion based
on the test results sued.118 They argued that the city’s refusal to
certify the test was discriminatory treatment under Title VII. The
Court agreed. It held that “race-based action like the City’s in this
case is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can
demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not taken the
action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute.”119 Finding that New Haven did not have a strong basis, the
Court held the city had violated Title VII.
No matter where you come down on the case, New Haven’s
predicament draws forth some sympathy.120 Neither option – keeping
the test or rejecting it – seems ideal from a moral perspective, and in
fact the city seems to have spent gone to significant time and expense
to avoid a result like the one the test produced. And facially, at least,
the city had a statistical basis for concern that the test had had a
discriminatory impact. Arguably, a Court predisposed to human
resources discretion would have given the city room to maneuver here.
In fact, that is what the Society for Human Resources Management
(SHRM) argued in its amicus brief:
SHRM and its members wish to maintain the flexibility in
existing law that allows employers and other test users
significant discretion in deciding how best to address
disparate-impact issues: whether to proceed with a given
selection procedure subject to completion of the validation
process; whether to modify expected uses so as to ensure
that scoring and ranking of scores are valid and fair; or

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 562-63.
119 Id. at 563.
120 Id. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“This case presents an unfortunate situation .
. . .”); Luke Appling, Recent Development, Ricci v. DeStefano, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 147, 147 (2010) (“In March 2004, the City of New Haven, Connecticut faced a
difficult choice.”).
117
118
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whether to substitute a different selection process with a
lesser disparate impact on particular groups.121
In order to preserve this flexibility, argued SHRM’s brief, the Court
needed to find the City’s decision to be constitutional.
Instead, the Court held that the City acted unconstitutionally
because it lacked a strong basis in evidence to believe that going
forward with the test results would violate Title VII’s disparate impact
provision. In so doing, the Court seems to set up a Scylla-andCharibdis scenario for future employers. As Justice Ginsburg argued,
“The strong-basis-in-evidence standard, however, as barely described
in general, and cavalierly applied in this case, makes voluntary
compliance a hazardous venture.”122 A court that was simply probusiness or intent on voluntary compliance would not have ruled the
way it did in Ricci. It would instead have given employers wide berth
to conduct their own analyses and make decisions based on those
analyses. But, despite the SHRM’s argument to the contrary, that
does not mean that Ricci is an anti-HR opinion. In fact, the Ricci
decision is most legitimately justified as an effort to protect HR efforts
in the areas of promotion and testing.
The Court set up two alternative paths for finding a strong basis
in evidence for discriminatory impact liability. First, the employer
may have a strong basis in evidence to believe that examinations were
not job-related and consistent with business necessity. Or second, the
employer may have a strong basis in evidence to believe there existed
equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative to the examinations. In a
somewhat surprising move, the Court did not remand to the lower
courts to determine whether New Haven met this standard; instead, it
ruled that the city had failed to do so and thus was in violation.123 The
Court based its determination on its support for the time, resources,
and care that had been spent in crafting the examinations in the first
place.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Society for Human Resource Management in Support of
Petitioner at 1, Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (Nos. 07–1428, 08–328)
[hereinafter SHRM Ricci Amicus Brief].
122 Id. at 629 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also id. (noting “the discordance of the
Court's opinion with the voluntary compliance ideal”).
123 Id. at 631 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When this Court formulates a new legal
rule, the ordinary course is to remand and allow the lower courts to apply the rule in
the first instance.”).
121
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The Court first found that there was “no genuine dispute” that
the examinations were job-related and consistent with business
necessity. The Court noted that the examinations were based on IOS’s
“painstaking analyses” of the officer positions as gleaned through
source material and direct observation.124 Although some candidates
complained about certain questions, these complaints were reviewed
and, in one case, acted upon.125 The City never requested from IOS the
follow-up report analyzing the validity of the results, despite the fact
that the report was part of the contract.126 All of these factors point to
the reasonable and good-faith efforts of IOS, the human resources
consultants who managed the testing process. To the extent that
throwing the test out was an indictment of IOS’s work, the Court found
that such an indictment was completely unjustified.
The Court then fended off arguments that a better alternative
set of testing instruments were available. Critics of the test argued
that the oral portion should have been more heavily weighted; that the
city could have interpreted its internal procedures differently; and that
an alternative testing method such as an “assessment center process”
would have been superior.127 Essentially, the Court rejects these
alternatives as ex post efforts to rejigger the results, without proof that
they are in fact better testing instruments.128
The Court is
particularly dismissive of the alternative testing method evidence, as it
was provided by a direct competitor of IOS.129 The competitor’s
witness admitted that he had not studied the test in detail, and offered
praise for the test at points.130 He also made it clear he was angling
for future work; in fact, the competitor ended up getting significant
business from the city after it had rejected IOS’s efforts.131 Such mixed
testimony was insufficient, in the Court’s eyes, to create an issue of
material fact.
The Court did not say that race could not play a role in the
creation of a testing instrument. In fact, it is clear that New Haven
Ricci, 557 U.S. at 588.
Id. The Court also noted that an outside advisor “suspect[ed] that some of the
criticisms ... [leveled] by candidates were not valid.” Id.
126 Id. at 589.
127 Id. at 589-92.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 591-92.
130 Id.
131 Id.
124
125
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and IOS were concerned about racial disparity on the test, and that
they undertook efforts to redress any racial imbalance at the outset.
As the Court states, “Title VII does not prohibit an employer from
considering, before administering a test or practice, how to design that
test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity for all individuals,
regardless of their race. And when, during the test-design stage, an
employer invites comments to ensure the test is fair, that process can
provide a common ground for open discussions toward that end.”132
However, the Court also makes clear that once the test has been taken,
the time for second-guessing is over. Only a strong basis to believe
that the tests were ill-designed, or that there were better alternatives
available, will allow for the test results to be ignored.
Thus, a decision that initially seems to constrict employer
flexibility instead is designed to provide for HR certainty. The Court’s
opinion front-loads the review process for the examination and thereby
creates more certainty in the final results. It protects the reasonable
and good-faith efforts of HR professionals from ongoing, after-the-fact
debates about the validity of the mechanism. It is a pro-HR decision in
that it seeks to insulate HR business judgment from ex post scrutiny.
Although the Court held New Haven liable in this instance, it perhaps
intended Ricci to embolden future employers to stick with their tests
and thereby give such tests more credibility going forward.
The Ricci test does have some flexibility and ambiguity, in that a
“strong basis” does not mean certain liability.133 But in the narrative
of the Court’s opinion, the most trustworthy player would seem to be
IOS. Ricci reasserts the role of HR professionals in managing the
hiring and promotion process.134 And it gives such professionals
deference in doing their jobs. By holding New Haven liable for
rejecting its test after the fact, the Court sends a signal: in HR we
trust, and so should you.
132
133

Ricci, 557 U.S. at 585.
Id. at 581 (rejecting the rule that “an employer in fact must be in violation of the

disparate-impact provision” because such a rule would “bring compliance efforts to a
near standstill”).
134 Interestingly, the SHRM amicus brief does not discuss the development of the test
in its Statement of the Case, nor does it ever mention IOS by name. See SHRM Ricci
Amicus Brief, supra note SHRM2009. Instead, it argues that the City should have
the right to question the test after the fact, particularly if the City follows the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures promulgated by the EEOC.
Id. at 13-18.
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The majority’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes135 is
the flip side of that trust: namely, distrust in the courts. The Dukes
case involved a Title VII class action brought by three named plaintiffs
on behalf of 1.5 million employees and former employees of Wal-Mart
stores across the country.136 At issue was Wal-Mart’s system of
supervision, including pay and promotion decisions, which the Court’s
opinion (and Wal-Mart) describe as highly discretionary at the grass
roots level. For pay, lower-level managers have discretion to set pay
within certain ranges, while higher-level executives set the ranges for
managers and other salaried employees.137 Promotions are also made
at lower levels. Although admission to Wal-Mart’s management
training system does require that certain objective factors be met, such
as above-average performance ratings and a willingness to relocate,
managers have significant discretion in selecting candidates for
training and for promotions beyond the program.138 It is this common
personnel practice—namely, discretion over pay and promotion at
lower levels—that plaintiffs allege as the common factor that created
the discrimination against the class.
The Dukes Court was unanimous in rejecting the lower court’s
class action certification as a Rule 23(b)(2) class.139 However, the four
dissenters would have given the plaintiffs leave to replead their action
as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action,140 while the majority also rejected the
certification for failing to meet the commonality requirement in Rule
23(a)(2).141 According to the majority, it was possible that some
number—possibly even a large number—of female Wal-Mart
employees had individual Title VII claims based on their mistreatment
at the hands of a particular supervisor. However, for the claims to be
triable as a class action, the plaintiffs had to share a “common
contention” that was “of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution.”142 As the majority pointed out, “Here respondents wish to
sue about literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without
135
136

131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011).
Id. at 2547.

Id.
Id.
139 See id. at 2557; id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
137
138

part).

Id.
Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2550-57.
142 Id. at 2551.
140
141
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some glue holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together,
it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members'
claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question
why was I disfavored.”143 Thus, in order for the class action to proceed,
the discretionary system in and of itself had to be the common answer
to this question.
The dissent seemed comfortable with the notion that a policy of
great discretion on the part of lower-level supervisors could itself be
the root cause of discrimination. That discretion was allegedly warped
in part by the fact that most managers were men, and thus would be
more likely to choose men for promotion and higher pay, as well as in
part by a corporate culture that was suffused with sexism.144 The
dissent summarized its position in this way: “Wal–Mart's delegation of
discretion over pay and promotions is a policy uniform throughout all
stores. The very nature of discretion is that people will exercise it in
various ways. A system of delegated discretion . . . is a practice
actionable under Title VII when it produces discriminatory
outcomes.”145 However, the majority rejected the dissent’s approach as
giving the plaintiff’s case too much credence. The majority opinion
found the plaintiff’s anecdotal evidence to be far too thin to support a
class-based inference of discrimination.146 It rejected the statistical
evidence as insufficient to prove discrimination against the members of
the class.147 And it rejected plaintiffs’ sociological evidence that WalMart had a “strong corporate culture” that rendered it “vulnerable” to
gender bias.148 According to the majority, it could “safely disregard”
this testimony once the sociologist conceded that he did not have any
way to quantify the impact of this culture on actual employment
decisions.149
If it seems like this is getting into the merits of plaintiffs’ case,
then perhaps it is. The dissenters argued that the majority was in fact
labeling its concerns as “commonality” issues when they were actually
issues for consideration under Rule 23(b)(3).150 In either case, the
Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2562-63 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145 Id. at 2567.
146 Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556.
147 Id. at 2555-56.
148 Id. at 2553-54.
149 Id. at 2554.
150 Id. at 2565-66 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
143
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plaintiffs seem to facially have the makings of a certifiable class action:
common employee management system plus significantly lopsided
statistics equal Title VII class action. The majority could not gainsay
the fact that a purely discretionary system may in fact be a vehicle for
discrimination. But it can, however, require the plaintiffs to show just
exactly how that discretion was warped in a particular case. The
Court stated:
To be sure, we have recognized that, “in appropriate
cases,” giving discretion to lower-level supervisors can be
the basis of Title VII liability under a disparate-impact
theory—since an employer's undisciplined system of
subjective decisionmaking can have precisely the same
effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination. . . . But the recognition that this type of
Title VII claim “can” exist does not lead to the conclusion
that every employee in a company using a system of
discretion has such a claim in common. To the contrary,
left to their own devices most managers in any
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation
that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral,
performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that
produce no actionable disparity at all. Others may choose
to reward various attributes that produce disparate
impact—such as scores on general aptitude tests or
educational achievements. . . . And still other managers
may be guilty of intentional discrimination that produces
a sex-based disparity. In such a company, demonstrating
the invalidity of one manager's use of discretion will do
nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's. A
party seeking to certify a nationwide class will be unable
to show that all the employees' Title VII claims will in fact
depend on the answers to common questions.151
This passage hits at the crux of the Court’s theory of the case.
Discretion itself cannot be enough; there must be some discriminatory
inference strong enough to extend across the individual actions at
issue or (as in this case) a class of plaintiffs. And that’s because,
151

Id. at 2554.
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according to the majority, “left to their own devices most managers in
any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that
forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performancebased criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable
disparity at all.”152 And yet in Dukes, there was a disparity: although
women filled 70 percent of the hourly jobs in Wal-Mart stores, they
made up only 33 percent of management employees.153 The Court
consigns this disparity to the realm of individual actions.
The Court’s defense of discretion, even in the face of disparity
and some limited but noxious anecdotal evidence, has larger
ramifications. By protecting the role of discretion in personnel
decisionmaking, the Court preserved a certain approach to HR
management against class-action attack. This position echoes the
SHRM amicus brief, which argued that individualized decisionmaking
programs reflected sound HR practices.154 More importantly, the
Court affirmed the notion that, even in the face of anecdotal and
statistical evidence to the contrary, the bad faith of individual
managers cannot be presumed. Instead, the opinion assumes that
discretion will be used appropriately until proven otherwise. It keeps
courts out of the business of mandating changes to discretionary
personnel practices, and instead keeps them focused on the rotten
actors who use discretion improperly.155 As such, they work with HR
professionals to police a personnel system, rather than mandating that
such professionals use a system that creates a nondiscriminatory
result. In the short term, this may result in more complete justice for

152
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Id.
Id. at 2563 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Brief for Amici Curiae Society for Human Resource Management and HR Policy
Association in Support of Petitioner at 8, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct.
2541 (2011) (No. 10-277) [hereinafter SHRM Dukes Amicus Brief]. SHRM also noted
that “certifying a massive class without even considering the impact of Wal-Mart’s
diversity policies on its culture and decision-making” would “underestimate[] the
value of such programs and weaken[] the incentives to create or maintain voluntary
diversity programs.” Id.
155 See also Matt Bodie, Workplace Rules, Room for Debate, NYTIMES.COM, at:
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-classaction/leaving-it-to-the-workplace (“Allowing these claims to go forward as a class
would transfer a huge chunk of employee management from private human resources
professionals to the courts. And that does not interest the Roberts Court in the
least.”).
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those plaintiffs who were severely harmed. But it does reflect the
Court’s faith in the good faith of Wal-Mart managers.
If Dukes is the Roberts Court’s most famous employment law
case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc.156 is its most
notorious. Its crabbed and parsimonious reading of Title VII’s statute
of limitations was roundly rejected by Congress, 157 and the plaintiff
has become something of a celebrity in the aftermath.158 The Court’s
holding – that plaintiffs are responsible for determining if their pay is
discriminatory, even if they have no idea about the discrimination –
seems to reflect a tin-eared approach to the underlying problem. There
is such an obvious objection to the impracticality of the Court’s holding
that even legal laity had grounds to object. Why would the Court put
itself in such a controversial position? The decision was decidedly proemployer, conservative, and anti-litigation. And perhaps these labels
tell the entire story. But once again, I would argue that the Court is
looking at the case not through the eyes of Lilly Ledbetter, but through
the eyes of HR departments. And the case looks less objectionable
through those lenses.
Ledbetter worked at Goodyear for almost twenty years. Over
time, her pay fell off in comparison with her cohort of managers, who
were all men. At the end of her employ, Ledbetter was making roughly
$3700 a month, compared with a range of $4200 to $5200 for her
colleagues.159 Ledbetter had no sense of this disparity, however, until
she took early retirement. The average person can sympathize (or
perhaps empathize) with Ledbetter’s anger and sense of betrayal at
finding out about the large difference in pay. Moreover, it is easy to
understand why she didn’t know about it. As Justic Ginsburg related,
in dissent:
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden
from the employee's view. Employers may keep under
wraps the pay differentials maintained among
supervisors, no less the reasons for those differentials.
Small initial discrepancies may not be seen as meet for a
550 U.S. 618 (2007).
Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2009).
158 Gail Collins, Lily’s Big Day, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at A27.
159 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
156
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federal case, particularly when the employee, trying to
succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to
making waves.160
The Court decision, written by Justice Alito, spends very little
time on the facts.161 The Court is fairly narrow and doctrinal in its
holding, pointing to the concept of “discrete discriminatory acts” as
triggering time limit for filing an EEOC charge.162 In justifying the
decision on policy grounds, the Court points to the usual justifications
for statutes of limitations: the need for prompt resolution of disputes,
the staleness of evidence over time, and the desire for finality.163 As
the Court notes, the 180-day EEOC charging deadline is “short by any
measure,” and it reflects an intention to “encourage the prompt
processing of all charges of employment discrimination.”164 The Court
also notes that the deadline “reflects Congress’ strong preference for
the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations
through voluntary conciliation and cooperation.”165 The Court spends
a more significant amount of time, however, analyzing the problem of
reconstructing intent many years after the fact. As the Court states:
For example, in a case such as this in which the plaintiff's
claim concerns the denial of raises, the employer's
challenged acts (the decisions not to increase the
employee's pay at the times in question) will almost
always be documented and will typically not even be in
160

Id. at 645 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

This is the Court’s only description:
Petitioner Lilly Ledbetter (Ledbetter) worked for respondent
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear) at its Gadsden,
Alabama, plant from 1979 until 1998. During much of this time,
salaried employees at the plant were given or denied raises based on
their supervisors' evaluation of their performance. In March 1998,
Ledbetter submitted a questionnaire to the EEOC alleging certain
acts of sex discrimination, and in July of that year she filed a formal
EEOC charge.
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).
162 Id. at 628 (“The EEOC charging period is triggered when a discrete unlawful
practice takes place.”).
163 Id. at 629-32.
164 Id. at 630.
165 Id. at 630-31.
161
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dispute. By contrast, the employer's intent is almost
always disputed, and evidence relating to intent may fade
quickly with time. In most disparate-treatment cases,
much if not all of the evidence of intent is circumstantial.
Thus, the critical issue in a case involving a long-past
performance evaluation will often be whether the
evaluation was so far off the mark that a sufficient
inference of discriminatory intent can be drawn. This can
be a subtle determination, and the passage of time may
seriously diminish the ability of the parties and the
factfinder to reconstruct what actually happened.166
This is a concern that would resonate with human resources.
Following the Faragher and Ellerth roadmap, HR departments look to
take the lead on internal investigations. If the department doesn’t
know about the problem, they cannot investigate it. Instead, they are
left to deal with the problem well after the fact. It is much harder to
demonstrate the good faith of an employment decision years later,
when evidence that would have been available contemporaneously
with the decision no longer exists.167
Moreover, compensation procedures are particularly thorny.
Because of the range of possibilities when it comes to compensation,
both in amount and type, the human resources literature has spent
extensive amounts of time on establishing best practices in the area.168
Of course, the problem of pay disparity is a continuing and insidious
problem. In my view, the Court’s decision reflected an overly legalistic
166

Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 631-32 (citations omitted).

SHRM and the Equal Employment Advisory Council make this point in their
brief, arguing that finding for Ledbetter would essentially eliminate the statute of
limitation and would impose an “undue burden” on the employer to defend against
stale claims. Brief for Amici Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council and Society
for Human Resource Management in Support of Petitioner at 5-6, Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 5-1074) [hereinafter
SHRM Ledbetter Amicus Brief].
168 See, e.g., Barry Gerhart et al., Employee Compensation: Theory, Practice, and
Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 528 (Gerald R. Ferris et
al. eds. 1995); Stephen E. Condrey et al., Compensation: Choosing and Using the
Best System for Your Organization, in HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 421 (Ronald R. Sims ed.
2007)
167

ROBERTS COURT AND HUMAN RESOURCES

33

and HR-oriented response to a difficult problem. But it becomes more
understandable when viewed through the eyes of those whose job it is
to manage compensation policies—especially when we do not assume
bad faith.

B. Retaliation
Those looking to apply a purely “conservative” or “pro-business”
meme to the Roberts Court’s labor and employment law cases must
contend with the Court’s work in the area of retaliation. The Court’s
decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,169 one
of its first decisions as a court, considered the scope of Title VII
protections afforded against retaliation. The Court rejected lower
courts’ narrower interpretations and instead concluded that the
antiretaliation provisions were not confined to those that are related to
employment or that occur at the workplace.170 The Court also held that
an employer’s actions could be considered retaliation if “they could well
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”171 Although Justice Alito concurred in judgment,
proposing a narrower standard,172 the other eight Justices all agreed to
the expansive interpretation. The retaliation at issue in the case could
have been viewed as de minimis, as the plaintiff had been reassigned
with loss in pay or benefits, and the employer retracted her 37-day
suspension after the fact, giving her backpay.173 Nevertheless, the
Court unanimously affirmed the jury’s award of $43,500.174
The Court arguably expanded its definition of retaliation in
Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.175 Thompson concerned
an employer’s alleged decision to fire the fiancé of an employee in
retaliation for the employee’s decision to file a sex discrimination claim
with the EEOC.176 The Court had “little trouble” concluding that the
alleged facts constituted a violation of Title VII’s antiretaliation

169
170

548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 57.

Id.
Id. at 75 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
173 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 58.
174 Id. at 58, 70-73.
171
172

175
176

131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
Id. at 867.
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provisions.177 Relying on the Burlington standard, the Court said: “We
think it obvious that a reasonable worker might be dissuaded from
engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiance would be
fired.”178 The Court was not troubled by the lack of bright-line rule as
to the type of relationships covered.179 Flexibility was necessary to
accommodate “the broad statutory text and the variety of workplace
contexts in which retaliation may occur.”180 Even though the fired
employee was not the target of the retaliatory motive, the Court found
he still had standing to sue because he fell within the “zone of
interests” protected by the statute.181 Because hurting the plaintiff
was the employer’s chosen and unlawful means for retaliating against
his fiancée, he was “well within the zone of interests sought to be
protected by Title VII.”182
The results of these cases may not seem particularly friendly to
human resources departments. In fact, SHRM (in conjunction with the
National Federation of Independent Businesses) filed an amicus brief
in support of the employer in Burlington.183 The brief argued that
retaliation should be limited to ultimate tangible employment actions,
such as firing or failure to promote, because otherwise the employer’s
hands would be tied in its day-to-day employee management.184
According to the amici, allowing retaliation claims on these lower-order
offenses would provide a “temptation” for employees and their
attorneys to opt out of the internal grievance system and file suit.185
However, two points should be noted. First, in both cases, an employee
had already stepped outside of the employer’s internal HR process and
filed an antidiscrimination claim. Thus, the claim that employers
needed to be free of government interference is belied to an extent by
Id.
Id. at 868.
179 Id. (“We expect that firing a close family member will almost always meet the
Burlington standard, and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will
177
178

almost never do so, but beyond that we are reluctant to generalize.”).

Id.
Id. at 870.
182 Id.
180
181

Brief for Amici Curiae Society for Human Resource Management and National
Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner ,
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259)
[hereinafter SHRM Burlington Amicus Brief].
184 Id. at 4, 16-21.
185 Id. at 14.
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the preexisting claim, which had already brought the government into
the picture. Second, the recognition of claims based on smaller-bore
offenses actually helps well-intentioned HR departments do their jobs
in correcting improper conduct. HR must stand as a bulwark against
the decisions by other firm participants that violate the law or public
policy. The amici recognized this in their brief:
[R]etaliation claims often concern conduct arising from an
emotional response that simply reflects human nature: a
supervisor wrongfully accused of discrimination may,
without intending impermissible retaliation, get caught
up in the heat of the moment. The employer's internal
mechanisms, implemented through a human resource
professional or upper level management, who act as
goalkeepers, fulfill the employer's responsibility to ensure
that human nature is not permitted to eviscerate
statutory rights. Missteps of human nature should be
permitted to be investigated and potentially cured by
internal review.186
What the brief misses, however, is that the incentive for other
members of the firm to go along with HR’s internal review is (at least
in part) the fear that the firm will suffer government sanctions if it
fails to obey HR. Thus, the HR department would be rendered
relatively toothless in fighting against retaliation if employers could
carry out their attacks below the radar without fear of being called to
account. And if lower-level retaliation goes unchecked, then future
potential claimants will be chilled in their decisions about filing a
claim—at least, if they still hope to stay with the company. Thus, poor
antiretaliation enforcement could cause the entire edifice of internal
dispute resolution to come crumbling down. As the Court recognized in
Burlington, “An employer can effectively retaliate against an employee
by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing
him harm outside the workplace. A provision limited to employmentrelated actions would not deter the many forms that effective
retaliation can take.”187

186
187

Id. at 17.
Burlington, 548 U.S. at 63-64 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).
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The ramifications of strong antiretaliation protection within a
HR-oriented framework became clear in Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee.188 In
Crawford, the employer had received complaints about inappropriate
sexual behavior by the newly-hired employee relations director for the
school district.189 The matter was routed through the human resources
department,190 and the assistant HR director contacted employees in
the director’s department pursuant to her investigation. One of those
employees, Vicky Crawford, reported to the assistant HR director that
the employee relations director had sexually harassed her and her
fellow employees.191 To this point, however, Crawford has brought no
formal complaint either internally, with the EEOC, or with a state civil
rights agency. After the investigation, the employer concluded that
Hughes had engaged in inappropriate behavior but did not take any
disciplinary investigation against him. All three employees who had
testified in the HR investigation, however, were terminated.192
Crawford was fired for alleged embezzlement and drug use – charges
she claimed were later proven to be untrue.193 She brought suit
claiming that she was protected by Title VII’s antiretaliation
provisions.
The lower courts had dismissed Crawford’s claim, finding that
her claim did not meet the requirements for Title VII’s protection
under either the “participation” clause or the “opposition” clause.
555 U.S. 271 (2009).
The discussion of facts was taken from Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee, 211 F. App'x. 373, 374-375 (6th Cir.
2006), which has a more extensive narrative of the events in question.
190 The employee relations director would normally have been responsible for
investigating such complaints. Id. at 374.
191 Id. at 375.
188
189

Id.
Id. On remand from the Supreme Court’s decision, the district court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment. Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of
Nashville and Davidson County Tennessee, 2009 WL 3348233 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 15,
192
193

2009). The case went to trial, and Crawford was awarded $1.56 million in damages.
E. Thomas Wood, Crawford Lawsuit Costs Metro Another $333,000, NASHVILLE
POST,
April
13,
2010,
at:
http://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2010/4/13/crawford_lawsuit_costs_metro_another
_333000. The employee relations director resigned in 2003 after acknowledging that
he had falsely claimed to be a lawyer, as Navy SEAL, and a professional football
player. Id.
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Section 704 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from
discriminating against an individual “because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,”
known as the opposition clause, or “because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,” known as the
participation clause.194 The Court did not reach the participationclause issue, but it held in favor of Crawford under the opposition
clause.195 Finding that “Crawford's description of the louche goings-on
would certainly qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as resistant
or antagonistic to Hughes's treatment,”196 the Court held that
opposition clause protection “extends to an employee who speaks out
about discrimination not on her own initiative, but in answering
questions during an employer's internal investigation.”197
The employer in Crawford argued that lowering the bar for
retaliation claims would discourage employers from investigating
claims in the first place. The Court expressed skepticism on this point,
as it noted “the incentive to enquire that follows from our decisions in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. Boca Raton.”198
Discussing the requirements of the affirmative defense, the Court
stated that “[e]mployers are thus subject to a strong inducement to
ferret out and put a stop to any discriminatory activity in their
operations as a way to break the circuit of imputed liability.”199
Indeed, the Court pooh-poohed the employer’s fears, stating: “The
possibility that an employer might someday want to fire someone who
might charge discrimination traceable to an internal investigation does

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-3 (2006).
The participation clause might seem to be a natural fit, since Crawford was
participating in an investigation of sexual harassment. But the statutory text poses
problems, as it limits coverage to filing a charge or to “participat[ing] . . . in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” Id. (emphasis added).
The employer’s investigation in Crawford may not be considered an investigation
under Title VII, as it is not a governmental investigation conducted pursuant to Title
VII authority and guidelines.
196 Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, Tenn., 555 U.S. 271,
276 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).
197 Id. at 273.
198 Id. at 278.
194
195

199

Id.
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not strike us as likely to diminish the attraction of an Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense.”200
More importantly, however, the Court did find it likely that a
contrary holding would considerably weaken the affirmative defense,
as it would undercut the mutual incentives that provide for its
operation. As the Court described:
If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer's questions
could be penalized with no remedy, prudent employees
would have a good reason to keep quiet about Title VII
offenses against themselves or against others. This is no
imaginary horrible given the documented indications that
“[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people stay
silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and
discrimination.” Brake, Retaliation, 90 Minn. L.Rev. 18,
20 (2005); see also id., at 37, and n. 58 (compiling studies).
The appeals court's rule would thus create a real dilemma
for any knowledgeable employee in a hostile work
environment if the boss took steps to assure a defense
under our cases. If the employee reported discrimination
in response to the enquiries, the employer might well be
free to penalize her for speaking up. But if she kept quiet
about the discrimination and later filed a Title VII claim,
the employer might well escape liability, arguing that it
“exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct [any
discrimination] promptly” but “the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of ... preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”
Ellerth, supra, at765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Nothing in the
statute's text or our precedent supports this catch-22.201
Ultimately, the Crawford Court – unanimous in result, with
only Justices Alito and Scalia concurring in judgment – was moved by
concerns about its Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense. A strict
textual reading of the statute is more equivocal that the Court allows,
as an employee testifying about her boss’s behavior is not necessarily
200
201

Id. at 279.
Id.
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“opposing” it. In Crawford, the plaintiff had told her story at the
request of a human resources official as part of an official
investigation. Her report about the director’s behavior was arguably
part of her work duties; it was not an individual effort on her part to
vindicate the wrongs that she and others had suffered. The Court
dismisses the possibility that testimony about discrimination or
harassment could be supportive of such behavior as “eccentric
cases.”202 But it does not consider the possibility that such testimony
could be neither supportive nor opposed, but neutral. The fact that the
employee has not complained about such behavior, either to the
employer or the government, is further evidence of neutrality. It is
something of stretch to say that invited testimony about a coworker’s
behavior in the context of an employer’s investigation means that the
employee “has opposed [a] practice made an unlawful employment
practice” under Title VII.203
The weakness of the textual argument, in my view, heightens
the importance of the Court’s policy arguments. And those policy
arguments rest on the protection of the Faragher-Ellerth defense. As
the Court notes in its opinion, “Ellerth and Faragher have prompted
many employers to adopt or strengthen procedures for investigating,
preventing, and correcting discriminatory conduct.” 204 If internal
investigations were not protected, then “knowledgeable” employees—
including those already represented by counsel—would logically (and
reasonably) refuse to participate in such investigations. In order to
protect human resources departments in conducting their jobs with
propriety and dispatch, the Court protected individuals who work with
HR departments. Crawford—who had not complained nor filed a
charge, yet provided unblinking testimony to HR personnel when
called upon to do so—was in this respect an ideal employee. It should
not be surprising that the Court insured that she and those like her
would not be left out of the new antidiscrimination regulatory
structure.

C. Privacy

202

Id. at 276-77.

Moreover, the Court does not determine whether the director’s conduct was
actually a violation of Title VII.
204 Id. at 278-79.
203
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The Supreme Court has only limited jurisdiction over workplace
privacy concerns. The primary employee privacy protections are found
within state law.205 However, public sector employees have federal
constitutional privacy protections. The Rehnquist Court attempted to
establish the standard for these protections in O’Connor v. Ortega.206
In that case, a state hospital conducted a search of the office and files
of an employee who had been accused of workplace wrongdoing.207 The
employee sued the state, claiming a violation of his Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches. 208 In a vote split
between a four-member plurality and one-member concurrence in the
judgment, the Court rejected the government’s claim that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply, but it also held that neither a warrant nor
probable cause were necessary to protect employees’ privacy interests
against routine, work-related searches.209 Instead, the Court found
that employees were entitled to privacy protections, but the protections
were limited in scope. In order to make a claim, the plurality required
that the employee first have a reasonable expectation of privacy as to
the location,210 and then that the employee’s expectations were violated
by a search that failed the standard of reasonableness as to its
inception or its scope.211 Implying a fairly nonrestrictive standard, the
plurality noted: “Ordinarily, a search of an employee's office by a
supervisor will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is
necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to
retrieve a needed file.”212 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia argued
Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 279
(2012) (“Without federal constitutional protections, private sector employees must
instead rely on either the common law of torts . . . or on various other federal and
state legislative enactments, for their workplace privacy rights.”).
206 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
207 Id. at 712-14 (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion). The employee was the chief of
professional education for psychiatry residents at the hospital. Id. at 712.
208 Id. at 714.
209 Id. at 717, 722; id. at 731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Specifically,
the four-member plurality limited itself to the Fourth Amendment standard for “a
noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an investigatory search for evidence of
suspected work-related employee misfeasance.” Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
210 Id. at 717-18.
211 Id. at 725-26.
212 Id. at 726.
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that employees always had an expectation of privacy in their
workplaces and personal effects therein.213 Thus, he advocated for the
adoption of a simple reasonableness test, and noted that common
workplace government searches would meet the test.214
Although the plurality and concurrence disagreed as to the
mechanics of the standard, both appeared to agree on basic principles.
The ultimate question is whether a search is reasonable within its
parameters. And the government acting as an employer is subject to
different standards of reasonableness than the government acting as
law enforcement.215 Thus, under either standard there is no need for a
warrant or probable cause, even if the search is designed to locate
evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance.216 The
public employer needs the discretion to act as private employers do in
conducting their business.217 This determination is not without critics,
starting with the four dissenters in the case.218 It shows that the
Court focused its mindset more on the milieu of the everyday
workplace, rather than the government’s power to search and seize.
The Roberts Court has continued to analyze public employee
privacy protections using Ortega’s flexible standards. The question in
City of Ontario v. Quon,219 as it was in Ortega, is whether the public
employer had violated its employee’s Fourth Amendment right against
Id. at 731 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I would hold, therefore, that
the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those
offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”).
214 See also id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The government, like
any other employer, needs frequent and convenient access to its desks, offices, and
file cabinets for work-related purposes. I would hold that government searches to
retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules—
searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the privateemployer context—do not violate the Fourth Amendment.”).
215 Id. at 717 (plurality opinion) (“The operational realities of the workplace, however,
may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion
is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official.”); id. at 732 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (concluding that “the government's status as employer,
and the employment-related character of the search, become relevant” when
considering the reasonableness of the search). See also Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of
Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (making this point).
216 Id. at 723 (plurality opinion).
217 Id. at 723-25 (plurality opinion); id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
218 Id. at 741-42 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no special need to
dispense with the warrant and probable cause requirements of reasonableness).
219 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).
213
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unreasonable searches. However, Quon involved a “location” with
more uncertain privacy protections: an employer’s text messaging
system. The system in question was run by the City of Ontario’s police
department to allow its officers to communicate with one another.220
The department provided the officers with pagers, and the messages
were transmitted over a private company’s wireless service pursuant
to a contract between the company and the city. The City’s privacy
policy reserved to the City the right to monitor the system, but a
supervisor within the department also indicated that the texts would
not be audited if employees paid for any additional expense incurred if
the employee went over the character amount.221 After a set of
employees consistently went over the character limits over several
months, the chief of police decided to conduct an audit to determine
whether the limits were too low for work-related purposes. The audit
determined that in fact the employees were using the messaging
system primarily for personal purposes, and that some of the texts
were sexually explicit. As a result of the audit, the plaintiff-employee
was allegedly disciplined.222
The Court had a number of complicated issues to address in
Quon. The immediate concern is how to frame the proper standard:
would it use the Ortega plurality’s two-step approach, Justice Scalia’s
reasonableness approach, or a newly created approach? Within these
tests, further intricacies lurked. What sort of privacy expectations do
employees have in this new electronic environment? On one level, the
interest of employees in their personal electronic communications
resonates with most users of these burgeoning technologies.223 On the
other hand, the interest of the public in accessing police records also
appears fairly strong.224 The Court’s opinion would need to address
these concerns.
Id. at 2625 (“The City issued pagers to [plaintiff] and other SWAT Team members
in order to help the SWAT Team mobilize and respond to emergency situations.”).
221 Id. The written privacy policy applied to the City’s email system but was applied
to the text messaging system orally at a staff meeting.
222 Id. at 2626.
223 Id. at 2630 (“Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for
self-expression, even self-identification. That might strengthen the case for an
expectation of privacy.").
224 For a discussion of these ramifications, see Brief of Amici Curiae Los Angeles
Times Communications LLC, The Press-Enterprise Company, The Associated Press,
220
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Although the Quon majority does address these concerns, it
largely avoided answering them. Instead, it skipped all the way to the
end to determine that the search was reasonable and therefore
constitutional. In getting to this end point, the Court decided not to
choose the proper standard to use225 or to determine whether the police
offers had a reasonable expectation of privacy.226 Such diversions were
not necessary, because ultimately the search itself was justified in its
inception and reasonable in its scope. The Court found that the
Department had a reasonable basis for examining the text messages—
namely, its desire to know whether the text messaging character limit
was sufficient for the officers’ needs—and found the two-month scope
of the search to be reasonable as well.227 Because the department
acted reasonably in conducting the search, said the Court, the search
was constitutional.
In jumping ahead to the final doctrinal hurdle to resolve the
case, the Court arguably chose the weakest link upon which to rest its
case. The department had told the officers that it would allow them to
reimburse it for any text-messaging overages and, if they did so, there
would be no need to audit the messages themselves.228
The
department leadership apparently changed its mind, because they had
become “tired of being bill collectors” and because they were worried
that the existing character limits were too low.229 Neither of these is
really a good reason to conduct a search of the contents of the messages
without notifying the officers ahead of time. Had the department been
worried about malfeasance or even misfeasance of some kind, the
search might have made more sense. But the two justifications
provided seem fairly weak, especially when the department could have

The E.W. Scripps Co., The California Newspapers Publishers Association, The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, The First Amendment Coalition and
Californians Aware in Support of Petitioners , City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S.Ct.
2619 (2010) (No. 08-1332).
225 Quon, 130 S.Ct. at 2628-29 (“It is not necessary to resolve [which test is correct.]
The two O’Connor [v. Ortega] approaches—the plurality’s and Justice Scalia’s—
therefore lead to the same result here.”).
226 Id. at 2630 (assuming arguendo that Quon had a reasonable expectation of
privacy).
227 Id. at 2631.
228 Id. at 2625.
229 Id. at 2626.
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simply changed its policy going forward.230 There was no need for
exigency. Despite the existence of less intrusive means of searching,
with seemingly no loss in effectiveness, the Court still found the search
to be reasonable. The Court responded to this concern by noting that
the government need not use the least intrusive methods possible in
order for the search to be reasonable.231 Instead, the Court gave the
department wide berth in determining how to conduct its review of the
text-messaging system. The Court held: “[A] reasonable employee
would be aware that sound management principles might require the
audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being
appropriately used.”232 Notice what the Court is saying: an employee
should be reasonable enough to think in terms of “sound management
principles.”
Paul Secunda has argued that the Quon opinion continues the
trend toward the “privatization” of public employee privacy.233 In his
view, the Court has looked to the private sector in determining the
proper levels of privacy protections afforded to public employees. 234
Such an approach would be in line with a Court that took a humanresources perspective. Employee privacy is a critical workplace issue,
and much remains uncertain about the extent to which employees can
fence out employer intrusions within the workplace. The Supreme
Court, put into the role of HR manager thanks to the
constitutionalization of public-employee privacy, opts for a doctrine
that looks to follow reasonable HR practices. One can understand why
the Court would blanche at warrant or probable cause requirements,
as suggested by commentators like Secunda for certain
circumstances.235 Such requirements would dramatically depart from
the modus operandi of the modern workplace.

This approach was suggested by the Court of Appeals below. Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 909 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that there were “a
230

host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 character limit . . . without
intruding on Appellants' Fourth Amendment rights”)..
231 Quon, 130 S.Ct at 2632.
232 Id. at 2631.
233 Secunda, supra note PS2012, at 281.
234 Id. (“But rather than elevating private-sector privacy rights to the public-sector
level, Quon suggests that public employee workplace privacy rights should be
‘privatized’ and reduced to the level of employees in the private sector.”).
235 Id. at 312-15 (arguing for such requirements for investigatory searches).

ROBERTS COURT AND HUMAN RESOURCES

45

The Court’s HR-oriented approach to public-employee privacy is
even more apparent in National Aeronautics and Space Administration
v. Nelson.236 In that case, contract employees at NASA’s Jet
Propulsion Laboratory were required to go through background checks
due to a change in regulatory procedure.237 These employees were
given a questionnaire to complete, and additional questionnaires were
sent to the employees’ references and past landlords.238 Employees
subject to this background check process brought suit, arguing that the
process infringed upon their rights to informational privacy.239 The
Ninth Circuit agreed, highlighting two aspects of the investigations
that were problematic.240 First, the employee questionnaire asked, as
a follow-up to an initial question about drug use, whether the employee
had had any treatment or counseling for drug use in the last year.241
Second, the questionnaire sent to references asked a series of openended questions pertaining to the employees’ honesty, financial
integrity, drug use, and overall “suitability” for government
employment.242 The circuit court enjoined these aspects of the
investigation.243
As in Quon, the Supreme Court had serious doctrinal issues to
tackle in resolving Nelson. The most important question was whether
a right to information privacy even existed. The Court had alluded to
an interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” in Whalen v.
Roe244 and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,245 but had
never established whether a constitutional right existed. As in Quon,
however, the Court once again skipped through the preliminaries to
find that the questionnaires were in fact reasonable. The Court
assumed, without deciding, that the constitutional right to information

131 S.Ct. 746 (2011).
Id. at 752. The change was accomplished through a presidential directive. See
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD -12—Policy for a Common
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Public Papers of the
President, George W. Bush, Vol. 2, Aug. 27, 2007, at 1765, App. 127.
238 Id. at 752-53.
239 Id. at 754.
240 Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 530 F.3d 865, 878-81 (9th Cir. 2008).
241 Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 759.
242 Id. at 761.
243 Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878-81.
244 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
245 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977).
236
237
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privacy existed.246
Instead, the Court examined whether the
government’s questions would violate such a right, and it concluded
that they would not.247 In conducting its review, the Court compared
the questions at issue to employment practices used in businesses
across the country.248 In the Court’s view, these questions were “part
of a standard employment background check of the sort used by
millions of private employers.”249
Discussing the drug-related
inquiries, the Court contended that “[l]ike any employer, the
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, lawabiding persons who will efficiently and effectively discharge their
duties.”250 Even if the phrasing of the question was potentially more
intrusive than necessary, the Court rejected any constitutional
requirement to choose the least restrictive means.251 As for the openended questions for references, the Court looked to both public and
private HR practices in determining their reasonableness:
The reasonableness of such open-ended questions is
illustrated by their pervasiveness in the public and
private sectors. Form 42 alone is sent out by the
Government over 1.8 million times annually. Ibid. In
addition, the use of open-ended questions in employment
background checks appears to be equally commonplace in
the private sector. See, e.g., S. Bock et al., Mandated
Benefits 2008 Compliance Guide, Exh. 20.1, A Sample
Policy on Reference Checks on Job Applicants (“Following
are the guidelines for conducting a telephone reference
check: ... Ask open-ended questions, then wait for the
respondent to answer”); M. Zweig, Human Resources
Management 87 (1991) (“Also ask, ‘Is there anything else
I need to know about [candidate's name]?’ This kind of
246

Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 751.

The judgment was unanimous; Justices Scalia and Thomas filed opinions
concurring in the judgment in which they found no constitutional right to
information privacy. See id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 769
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
248 Nelson, 131 S.Ct. at 758 (arguing that the government “could not function” if
every employment decision became a constitutional matter).
247

Id.
Id. at 759-60 (citations and quotations omitted).
251 Id. at 760.
249
250
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open-ended question may turn up all kinds of information
you wouldn't have gotten any other way”). The use of
similar open-ended questions by the Government is
reasonable and furthers its interests in managing its
operations.252
In both Quon and Nelson, the Supreme Court confronted
weighty constitutional questions about the scope of the Fourth
Amendment’s protections as well as the existence of a right to
information privacy. But it moved past both these questions on to
more comfortable terrain—namely, whether the HR policies and
practices in question had been reasonable.
Looking to private
businesses for comparison, the Court found that the public employers
had acted properly. These cases provide another set of examples as to
how the Court addresses employment issues most comfortably from the
human resources perspective.

D. ERISA
ERISA and HR go hand-in-hand.
Human resources
departments generally have the responsibility of managing the pension
and welfare benefits that are governed by ERISA’s protections.
ERISA’s complexity arguably instigated the growth of HR
departments, as professional training aids in the understanding of the
financial, accounting, and legal requirements necessary to provide
these benefits. The tax ramifications are sufficiently beneficial to
induce the creation of health care, pension, and other benefit plans.
But, as the Court is keen to remind in its opinions, nothing requires
employers to have these plans.
ERISA has a unique and somewhat paradoxical structure. On
the one hand, employers generally have complete freedom in setting up
their plan, as well as in modifying a plans contributions or benefits
across the board. Once established, however, the plan must be
administered for the ultimate good of the beneficiaries.
The
employer—switching hats, as in trust law, from settler to trustee—
must shift from negotiating with its employees to managing the plan in
their interest. It is not always clear when the roles change, or what we
expect from employers in playing these roles.
252

Id. at 761.
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Although most of us would likely look at an ERISA case through
the eyes of the beneficiary, the Roberts Court has evinced a sympathy
for the human resources side of the equation. As the Court makes
clear, there are doctrinal and instrumental reasons for doing so. But
the Roberts Court seems to get the melody of HR, as well as the basic
notes, and it shows. Its decisions in this area may have some elements
of a conservative, pro-business, and/or anti-litigation approach.
However, once again I believe the most consistent theme is that of
protection for and empathy towards human resources departments.
The Court believes that businesses must govern themselves in the
area, and it wants to provide HR departments with the means and
independence to do so.
The foundational Rehnquist Court case for the Roberts Court’s
ERISA jurisprudence is Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.253 The
plaintiffs in Firestone had been working for Firestone until their
workplaces were sold to Occidental Petroleum.254 Plaintiffs believed
they were entitled to termination pay under the Firestone termination
pay plan.255 Firestone disagreed and refused to pay out any benefits.
Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the denial of benefits under ERISA
§ 1132(a)(1).256
The Court, in a unanimous ruling, held that
Firestone’s denial had to be reviewed under a de novo standard.257 The
Court’s opinion reads as a pro-plaintiff opinion, or at least not a prodefendant one. The Court emphasizes the importance of viewing
ERISA plans as trusts, and thus employees as beneficiaries.258 It
rejects Firestone’s argument for an arbitrary and capricious standard
of review, finding that such a “reading of ERISA would require us to
impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was
enacted.”259 However, the Court’s holding ultimately paved the way
489 U.S. 101 (1989).
Id. at 105.
255 This plan, unbeknownst to Firestone at the time, was an ERISA-covered plan. Id.
256 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006).
257 Id. at 115.
258 Id. at 110 (“ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary
responsibility provisions codify and make applicable to ERISA fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts.”) (citations omitted); id. at
111 (“In determining the appropriate standard of review for actions under §
1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.”)
259 Id. at 113-14.
253
254
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for employers to do exactly that. The Court stated: “we hold that a
denial of benefits challenged under § 1132(a)(1)(B) is to be reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”260 That
“unless,” of course, was fairly easy for employers to add to their plans.
As a result, arbitrary and capricious review is available to any
employer that wants it.
The Court’s opinion in Firestone is somewhat mixed about the
need to protect employers from judicial oversight. In the following
passage, the Court discusses this concern:
Firestone and its amici also assert that a de novo
standard would contravene the spirit of ERISA because it
would impose much higher administrative and litigation
costs and therefore discourage employers from creating
benefit plans. Because even under the arbitrary and
capricious standard an employer's denial of benefits could
be subject to judicial review, the assumption seems to be
that a de novo standard would encourage more litigation
by employees, participants, and beneficiaries who wish to
assert their right to benefits. Neither general principles of
trust law nor a concern for impartial decisionmaking,
however, forecloses parties from agreeing upon a
narrower standard of review. Moreover, as to both funded
and unfunded plans, the threat of increased litigation is
not sufficient to outweigh the reasons for a de novo
standard that we have already explained.261
The Roberts Court has no such ambivalence. As discussed below, the
Court has consistently found in favor of greater HR discretion and
authority. Sometimes that means cutting back on beneficiaries’
litigation rights. But sometimes, as in the Crawford case, it means
providing for more relief in order to solidify the private administrative
structure that the Court is endeavoring to maintain.

260
261

Id. at 115.
Id. at 114-15.

ROBERTS COURT AND HUMAN RESOURCES

50

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn262 follows in the tradition of
Firestone as an opinion that looked more pro-plaintiff at the time it
was written. At issue in the case is whether there is a conflict of
interest when an plan administrator is also the payer of benefits and,
if so, what effect that conflict has. The majority opinion, written by
Justice Breyer, found that the roles of decider and payer do, in fact,
create a conflict of interest in either an employer or an insurance
company.263 The Court also decided that this conflict of interest is to
be taken into account as a factor in determining whether to uphold the
denial of benefits. However, the Court also left the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review in place, so that the conflict is only a
factor as to whether the plan administrator abused its discretion.264
As a result, the case has become more important for its retention of the
abuse of discretion standard in the face of a conflict of interest, rather
than for the fact that it takes that conflict into account in some way.
The facts in Metropolitan Life engender a fair amount of
sympathy. After being diagnosed with a severe heart condition,
plaintiff sought to avail herself of disability protections afforded by the
employer as well as the government.265 The insurance company that
administered plaintiff’s employer’s plan gave her benefits for the initial
24 months after she was rendered unable to work.266
It also
encouraged her to seek social security benefits.267 After she obtained
those benefits, the insurance company claimed the award as a setoff
for their plan expenses.268 But it then denied her claim for long-term
disability benefits, even though the standard was close to the social
security standard.269
Given the insurance company’s duplicitous behavior, as well as
the inconsistencies in its defense of its decision, the case seems ripe for
an abuse of discretion finding. And ultimately, that judgment was
upheld by the Court. The larger question, however, is whether the
responsibility for paying out benefits creates a conflict of interest when
that party also decides whether to grant benefits. The Court, in dicta,
262
263

554 U.S. 105 (2008).
Id. at 108.

Id.
Id. at 109.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
264
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found a “clear” conflict of interest “where it is the employer that both
funds the plan and evaluates the claims.”270 Noting that reputational
concerns might push a private insurance company into better behavior,
the Court nevertheless found the defendant to have had a conflict of
interest. And it held that such a conflict should be taken into account
when reviewing the decision pursuant to a ERISA claim.
The Court’s decision was a favorable one to ERISA plaintiffs in
some respects, as the concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts and the
dissent by Justice Scalia make clear. These jurists would have opted
for a more limited role for the conflict: Chief Justice Roberts “would
instead consider the conflict of interest on review only where there is
evidence that the benefits denial was motivated or affected by the
administrator's conflict,”271 and Justice Scalia would have held that “a
fiduciary with a conflict does not abuse its discretion unless the conflict
actually and improperly motivates the decision.”272 However, the
decision is still favorable to ERISA administrators in that it maintains
the abuse of discretion standard. Changing the standard of review
would result in “adopting a rule that in practice could bring about near
universal review by judges de novo—i.e., without deference—of the
lion’s share of ERISA plan claims denials.”273 Ultimately, the standard
would be more important than whether an ambiguous conflict-ofinterest “factor” was made part of the abuse of discretion test.
The majority opinion is also aware of its effect on HR
decisionmaking, and it offers a set of suggestions by which ERISA plan
administrators can reduce the importance of the conflict of interest
factor. The Court states:
The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should
prove more important (perhaps of great importance)
where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it
affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited
to, cases where an insurance company administrator has
a history of biased claims administration. . . . It should
Id. at 112. This conclusion drew a harsh critique from Justice Scalia in dissent,
who argued that “I would not resolve this question until it has been presented and
argued.” Id. at 127 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271 Id. at 120 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
272 Id. at 127-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273 Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 116.
270
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prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point)
where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce
potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by
walling off claims administrators from those interested in
firm finances, or by imposing management checks that
penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of whom
the inaccuracy benefits.274
These guidelines are not quite a safe harbor, but the “vanishing point”
language is suggestive of that. Ultimately, the Court wants ERISA
plan administrators to manage their conflicts privately. Firewalls and
internal controls are likely to insulate future administrators from
concerns about their conflicts of interest. Like the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense, these suggestions provide a roadmap for
employers and HR professionals in carrying out their compliance
responsibilities.
Conkright v. Frommert275 continues the development of the law
regarding the review of ERISA benefit determinations. This is no
small matter: an estimated 1.9 million beneficiaries have claims denied
each year.276 It is in Conkright that the ramifications of Firestone and
Metropolitan Life become clear. The “abuse of discretion” standard,
which Firestone made available and Metropolitan Life kept in place,
becomes the centerpiece of the Court’s deference toward plan
administrators.277 That deference is to be kept in place even when the
administrator has already demonstrated a flawed understanding of the
plan and has used that understanding to harm beneficiaries.
The facts of Conkright are “exceedingly complicated,” according
to the Court, “[a]s in many ERISA matters.”278 The plaintiffs were
Xerox employees who left the company in the 1980’s, received lumpsum distributions of retirement benefits, and were later rehired. The
dispute involved how the pension plan accounted for that lump sum
274

Id. at 117 (citations omitted).

130 S.Ct. 1640 (2010).
Metropolitan Life, 554 U.S. at 116 (citing C. GRESENZ ET AL., A FLOOD OF
LITIGATION? 8 (1999), at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/2006/IP184.pdf )).
277 Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1646 (“We expanded Firestone's approach in Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn . . . . We held that, when the terms of a plan grant discretionary
authority to the plan administrator, a deferential standard of review remains
appropriate even in the face of a conflict.
278 Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1644.
275
276
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distribution in calculating the plaintiffs’ benefits after they were
rehired. The plan administrator created “phantom accounts” whereby
it calculated the hypothetical growth that the lump-sum distributions
would have experienced if they had stayed in the plans. The plaintiffs’
pension benefits were then reduced by that amount.279 Plaintiffs
challenged this method of calculation, and the Court of Appeals
ultimately found the method to be unreasonable. On remand, the plan
administrator submitted an affidavit with another method of
calculating the benefits. The district court did not give this suggestion
any deference, and it instead developed its own method of calculating
the impact of the lump-sum distributions on future benefits.
The complexity of the facts obscures the equities of the case. In
the majority’s telling, the plan administrator appears to be a good faith
actor, coming up with legitimate approaches that are ultimately
ignored by the district court. And not only does the district court
fashion its own approach, but its approach did not account for the
time-value of money, instead reducing the plans by the nominal
amount of the distributions.280 However, the dissent paints the
“phantom account” approach as much more unreasonable. In an
appendix to the opinion, the dissent explains how workers subject to
the phantom account make significantly less than if they had simply
been treated as new hires upon their return to Xerox.281 Perhaps more
damningly, the plan administrator never notified employees about the
phantom account method, other than vague language mentioning an
“offset” to their pensions.282 Given the complexity of the decisions
being made, this lack of notification is not reassuring as to the
administrator’s competence or good faith.
The majority opinion does not spend as much time on the facts
as the dissent, nor does it mention the administrator’s failure to notify
beneficiaries about the phantom account method. Instead, it focuses
on the need for deference to plan administrators, even in light of error.
In fact, the majority is remarkably empathetic to the administrators,
as the opening of the opinion makes clear:
Id. at 1645.
Id. at 1645.
281 Id. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (appendix) (explaining how a hypothetical
279
280

employee would get $690 per year upon his return to Xerox using the phantom
account method, while a new employee would get at least $3,500 annually).
282 Id. at 1653-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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People make mistakes. Even administrators of ERISA
plans. That should come as no surprise, given that the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is an
enormously complex and detailed statute, and the plans
that administrators must construe can be lengthy and
complicated. (The one at issue here runs to 81 pages, with
139 sections.) We held in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Bruch that an ERISA plan administrator with
discretionary authority to interpret a plan is entitled to
deference in exercising that discretion. The question here
is whether a single honest mistake in plan interpretation
justifies stripping the administrator of that deference for
subsequent related interpretations of the plan. We hold
that it does not.283
The focus on “mistake” here is critical: it is not as if the administrator
intentionally tried to misread the plan and deny benefits to employees.
A “single honest mistake,” the Court reasons, seems fairly excusable
and understandable.
The Court is setting up a picture of plan administrators as
neutral arbiters who act in good faith and have the interests of
beneficiaries at heart. And before we dismiss such a view as naïve or
even disingenuous, it is worthwhile to linger on the Court’s vision. As
the Court points out, “Congress enacted ERISA to ensure that
employees would receive the benefits they had earned, but Congress
did not require employers to establish benefit plans in the first
place.”284 Enforcement of employees’ rights must be balanced against
“the encouragement of the creation of such plans.”285 Part of the
encouragement, it would seem, is a great deal of deference to the
administrator in interpreting the plan.
ERISA plans are not
interpreted like contracts, in which the intent of the parties is parsed
through the written and oral manifestations of their agreement.
Instead, one side is given deference in its interpretation of the contract.
To counterbalance this deference, the administrator is expected to act
like a trustee, rather than a party to a contract.
Conkright, 130 S.Ct. at 1644 (citations and quotations omitted).
Id. at 1648.
285 Id. at 1649.
283
284
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This second part of the equation has always seemed a bit
untenable, or at least unnatural, and the Court evinces some desire to
move beyond it. The majority and the dissent spar over how trust law
should shape the level of deference afforded to the administrator after
an erroneous interpretation of the plan. The majority claims that trust
law is “unclear” on the issue, but cites to a set of fairly aged cases to
support the possibility of deference.286 The dissent, on the other hand,
claims the law clearly does not require deference after an abuse of
discretion, and it cites to the Restatement of Trusts and two treatises
for support and then deconstructs the majority’s cases.287 The majority
seems to acknowledge the flaws in its doctrinal argument by stating:
“While we are guided by principles of trust law in ERISA cases, we
have recognized before that trust law does not tell the entire story.
Here trust law does not resolve the specific issue before us, but the
guiding principles we have identified underlying ERISA do.”288 And it
is in its description of the “guiding principles . . . underlying ERISA”
that the Court’s attachment to human resources comes through.
The Court cites to the values of efficiency, predictability, and
uniformity as the core principles in its exegesis of ERISA. Deference to
the administrator’s interpretation promotes efficiency “by encouraging
resolution of benefits disputes through internal administrative
proceedings rather than costly litigation.”289 Such deference also
provides predictability, as “an employer can rely on the expertise of the
plan administrator rather than worry about unexpected and
inaccurate plan interpretations that might result from de novo judicial
review.”290 Finally, deference encourages uniformity by “helping to
avoid a patchwork of different interpretations of a plan, like the one
here, that covers employees in different jurisdictions-a result that
would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program
operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to
reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting
Id. at 1647-48 (citing to Hanford v. Clancy, 87 N.H. 458, 461, 183 A. 271, 272-273
(1936); In re Sullivan's Will, 144 Neb. 36, 40-41, 12 N.W.2d 148, 150-151 (1943);
Eaton v. Eaton, 82 N.H. 216, 218-219, 132 A. 10, 11 (1926); In re Marre's Estate, 18
Cal.2d 184, 190, 114 P.2d 586, 590-591 (1941); and Finch v. Wachovia Bank & Trust
Co., 156 N.C.App. 343, 348, 577 S.E.2d 306, 310 (2003)).
287 Id. at 1655-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288 Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1648.
289 Id. at 1649.
286
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them.”291 The Court pointed to the district court’s ruling in Conkright
as an example of what could happen if deference were not afforded.
The lower court settled on an interpretation that did not account for
the time value of money, was different that interpretations of the same
plan in other circuits, and fomented continued litigation.292 Deference,
on the other hand, would leave the plan’s reins in the hands of the
administrator, absent bad faith or severe incompetence.293
Conkright illuminates the Court’s core premise that runs,
somewhat hidden, through Firestone and Metropolitan Life: namely,
administrators must be given deference. This deference could be
characterized as conservative, pro-business, and anti-litigation. But it
can also be characterized as pro-human resources. That is ultimately
where the Court’s concern seems to reside.
Finally, both Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co.294 and
LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, Inc.295 are minor cases,
unanimous in their judgment, in which the Court attended to the edges
of ERISA’s regulatory scheme. In Hardt, the plaintiff brought an
ERISA action against her plan administrator for the administrator’s
long-term disability benefits. The district court dismissed both sides’
motions for summary judgment, but the court also indicated that it
was “inclined to rule” in favor of the plaintiff and gave the
administrator thirty days to reconsider its decision. 296 After the
administrator changed its decision, plaintiff petitioned the court for
attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court held that under ERISA’s attorneys
fees provision, the fee claimant need not be prevailing party to be
eligible for attorney fees under ERISA's general fee-shifting statute.
Instead, the claimant must show some degree of success on merits
before court may award attorney fees under ERISA's general feeshifting statute. In LaRue, an employee had sued his former employer
alleging that it had not properly followed his instructions as to his §
401(k) retirement savings plan.297 The lower courts dismissed the
Id.
Id. at 1649-51.
293 Id. at 1651 (“Multiple erroneous interpretations of the same plan provision, even if
291
292

issued in good faith, might well support a finding that a plan administrator is too
incompetent to exercise his discretion fairly . . . .”).
294 130 S.Ct. 2149 (2010).
295 552 U.S. 248 (2008).
296 Hardt, 130 S.Ct. at 2154.
297 LaRue, 552 U.S. at 251.
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claim, asserting that beneficiaries are only entitled to sue for damages
as to the “entire plan.” The Court reversed, holding that a § 401(k)
account should be treated as an “entire plan” and therefore the
plaintiff was entitled to damages.
We should not make too much of these cases. But in both
situations, the Court overturned a court of appeals’ decision and ruled
in favor of the plaintiff.
To that extent, they represent
counterexamples to the arguments that the Roberts Court is simply
conservative, pro-business, or anti-litigation. More importantly, they
represent human resources values as well. Hardt reflects the desire to
award parties who succeed, without requiring the technicality of a
formal judgment (and thus further litigation). LaRue shows that the
Court understands the new dynamics of pension plans, which favor
defined contribution plans over defined benefit plans. By attending to
minor ERISA issues with care and a concern for the underlying
process, the Court demonstrates its care and concern for ERISA and
the activities that it regulates.
III.

THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION

In The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice,298 William
Stuntz blamed the constitutionalization of criminal procedure for our
dysfunctional criminal law.
According to Stuntz, “[c]urrent
constitutional law makes the politics of criminal justice worse: more
punitive, more racist, and less protective of individual liberty.”299 This
counterintuitive result, claimed Stuntz, stemmed from the political
economy of the criminal justice system. Legislators and agencies only
want to spend in areas where they can also exercise control. While the
Court has extensively regulated policing and the trial process through
constitutional interpretation, it has left substantive criminal law and
sentencing largely free from oversight.300 As a result, legislators have
Stuntz, supra note WJS2006.
Id. at 785. See also id at 784 (“There is no way to run a test, but it seems likely
that because of the constitutional rules that govern policing and trial procedure,
criminal law is broader, sentencing rules are harsher, key criminal justice
institutions are more underfunded, and the population of arrestees and defendants is
more racially skewed than would otherwise be the case.”)
300 Id. at 782. Stuntz acknowledged that regulation of sentencing has increased in
the last few years. Id.
298
299
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focused their attention and spending in defining new crimes and
meting out punishment. In order to remedy this state of affairs,
Stuntz argued, the Court should roll back its criminal procedure
regulation in order to let states take more control.301 It should instead
focus on limited areas of constitutional concern that are likely to fester,
and allow states to experiment with different solutions in all areas of
the criminal justice system.302 Speaking more directly to progressive
criminal law scholars, Eric Miller has also called for a reconsideration
of the Warren Court’s criminal cases.303 According to Miller, the
traditional interpretation of the Court’s criminal procedure
jurisprudence has focused too much on rights, and not enough on the
regulation of police that such jurisprudence entailed.304 Instead of
focusing on rights, progressives needed to focus on the regulation of
law enforcement officers. Reconceiving the constitutional oversight of
justice as an endeavor in republican governance, rather than a rightbased scheme, would help reorient our perception to what really
matters in everyday criminal justice: namely, the cops.305
Just as the political economy of criminal law has focused on
constitutional rights, the political economy of employment law has
focused almost exclusively on employee legal rights and the litigation
that enforces them. The action in the employment law arena centers
around statutory rights that are enforced by private rights of action.
The gravamen behind these rights is the concern about employer
abuses of power, whether it be discriminating against certain kinds of
employees, paying low wages, failing to provide for promised benefits,
or preventing employees from taking sick or parental leave. However,
the relationship between employer and employer is not solely
oppositional; we need employers to employ us. In this way, just as we
need governments to provide us with security against crime, we need
employers to provide us with work and wages. In order to carry out
their responsibilities, both governments and employers need power,
authority, and flexibility. But we worry about them abusing their
power. As a result, we have constructed rights-based regimes to
protect those who suffer from abuses of power. In the criminal context,
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 831-50.
303 Miller, supra note EJM2010, at 3-5.
304 Id. at 5-6.
305 Id. at 76-80.
301
302
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we have constitutional rights that protect individuals against abuses
such as unreasonable searches and seizures. In the employment
context, we have statutory rights as to hiring, firing, and other
employment actions that protect individuals against abuses such as
discriminatory terminations. These rights provide the oversight of the
powerful institutions in question, and they provide remedies if an
individual suffers abuse.
In both contexts, however, legal academia’s focus on rights has
arguably obscured the bigger picture. As Stuntz and Miller argue, the
focus on constitutional rights has constricted legislative and executive
efforts to improve the overall functioning of the system.306 It has
frozen certain aspects of criminal procedure in constitutional amber,
and has left legislators to run amuck in other areas unfettered. We
need to take a step back and look at the larger picture, they argue,
particularly when it comes to the regulation of police.
Miller
contended that the Warren Court’s “rights revolution” was actually all
about regulation, and that a focus on rights has missed the real point
of the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence. 307 Rather than
creating rights, the Court was instead introducing a (federal)
regulatory regime into the realm of (state and local) policing. This
regulatory regime has been overlooked by commentators in their focus
on the contours of individual rights. Miller argued:
The central problem with left-liberal theories of policing is
that they are too negative, providing no real account of
good policing practices. Left-liberals are no more than
minimally interested in the process of criminal
investigation, because police investigation undermines
immunity from state coercion. Instead, left-liberals focus
on tightly restricting police discretion, which is usually
characterized as, at most, one step away from race or
class discrimination. Lacking a positive theory of policing,
left-liberals surrender the discussion of police practices to
centrists and conservatives. Left-liberals are left on the
fringes seeking to reduce policing as a means of
combating state repression.308
Stuntz, supra note WJS2006, at 832; Miller, supra note EJM2010, at 3-5.
Id. at 4-5.
308 Id. at 76-77.
306
307
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Stuntz makes a similar claim. He argues that cops have been woefully
underappreciated by legal academics in their efforts to improve the
criminal justice system. He points to President Clinton’s “100,000 cops
on the street” legislation as the one truly successful recent criminal
justice initiative,309 and he rues the lack of a federal “No Cop Left
Behind” program.310 Stuntz’s prescription is radical: “the best thing to
do with the massive body of Fourth Amendment privacy regulation,
together with the equally massive body of law on the scope and limits
of the exclusionary rule, is to wipe it off the books.”311 In exchange, the
federal government should continue along the “100,000 cops” path to
reinvigorate its relationship with local law enforcement. 312 In other
words: it’s about the cops, stupid.
Who are the cops when it comes to the workplace? Human
resources.313 Human resources departments implement the employer’s
policies when it comes to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,
benefits, and work environment. Just as the police wield the authority
in the criminal procedure context at the grass roots level, human
resources employees wield workplace authority on the shop floor. They
make the particularized decisions—millions every day—that can lead
to abuse and discrimination. And like the police, they can be
demonized based on those abuses. But concern about that abuse
overshadows their importance to the functioning of business and
industry.
More importantly, it neglects an opportunity.
HR
departments are there, at least in part, to make sure that the employer
complies with labor and employment law. They are natural allies in
the effort to fight workplace abuse and discrimination. Rather than
seeing them as part of the problem, it is time to consider how they can
be part of the solution.
Of course, human resources professionals, like police officers,
can engage in both misfeasance and malfeasance on behalf of their
organizations. Critics of a compliance-based approach to employment
Stuntz, supra note WJS2006, at 810-11, 846 (noting it was combined with the
enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which provides for broad injunctive relief against
police departments if a pattern of constitutional violations are established).
310 Id. at 808-09.
311 Id. at 832.
312 Id. at 846.
313 LAZEAR, supra note ED1998, at 1 (“[Human resources professionals] are viewed as
company police whose role is to create hassles for others in the firm.”).
309
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law argue that HR departments are often deployed as managerial
tools, rather than independent monitors.314 A common thread of these
critiques is that HR programs may only serve as window dressing, or
may even hide existing discrimination behind particularly thick
curtains.315 Under such circumstances, HR departments are part of
the problem, rather than part of the solution, as they allow employers
(and courts) to appear as if they are addressing workplace injustices,
when in fact the problems are only submerged beneath a more
palatable exterior. HR may also make it harder for the employee to
sue successfully, either by delaying the claim or creating a plausible
paper trail for an innocent explanation.316
See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Discerning Form from Substance: Understanding
Employer Litigation Prevention Strategies, 3 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 5-7
314

(1999) (discussing employer compliance programs as, at least in part, “litigation
prevention strategies”); Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 3-5 (expressing the
concern that compliance regimes could ultimately leave the level of workplace sexual
harassment unaffected).
315 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note SBRFSU, at 964 (describing “how certain compliance
mechanisms, specifically those recommended by defense attorneys, may obscure
conditions of inequality”); Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 3 (criticizing the
Faragher/Ellerth approach for “a misguided culture of compliance, one in which
liability is measured not by whether employers successfully prevent harassment, but
instead whether they comply with judicially created prophylactic rules”).
316 For example, Brake and Grossman argue:
The past decade's surge of employer policies and procedures for
resolving discrimination complaints internally plays an important
role in contributing to the problems we identify. The channeling of
discrimination complaints into internal employer processes intersects
with both ends of the doctrine: the timely filing rules and the
retaliation protections. By failing to toll the limitations period on
formal remedies, participation in internal grievance processes can
run out the clock on an unsuspecting employee's formal assertion of
rights. In addition, because employer nondiscrimination policies
shape employees' beliefs about the scope of discrimination law, and
because participation in such processes falls under Title VII's
opposition clause instead of its more generous participation clause,
employees who participate in such processes may find themselves
without protection from retaliation if their perception of unlawful
discrimination turns out to be false. Supporters of an expanded role
for such internal processes have failed to consider the full costs of
such measures, at least under existing doctrine. In the current Title
VII rights-claiming framework, such measures risk supplanting, not
merely supplementing, Title VII's formal mechanisms for protecting
substantive rights.
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Suspicion of HR departments is natural and likely healthy.
However, dismissal of such departments is a luxury that reformers
cannot afford. The potential to exercise rights and obtain relief is
critical to a toothy system of workplace justice. But given the low
numbers of workers who formally exercise those rights within the
judicial system,317 it makes sense to consider ways to protect
employees through internal means. A recent trend in the theory of
workplace regulation is self-governance or “new” governance.318 New
governance argues for greater cooperation between government
officials, employer, and (sometimes) watchdog groups in seeking to
leverage enforcement resources across a broader range of activity.
These efforts, in a variety of fields, offer new methods for making sure
that employers are following the law. It is puzzling that in the midst
of the new governance discussions, human resources professionals
have been largely neglected.
Although HR may be dismissed as simply an arm of
management, the field has an independent tradition as a profession
and an academic field of study. Scholarship on human resources has
established large bodies of research on diversity programs,319 testing
procedures,320
compensation
mechanisms,321
and
employee
322
participation.
The history of human resources has many instances

Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII As A
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 934 (2008).
317 See Grossman, supra note JLG2003, at 51-52 (discussing why employees often
forego filing a formal complaint against workplace harassment).
318 ESTLUND, supra note CE2010; Lobel, supra note OL2004.
319 See, e.g., Valerie E. Sessa et al., Work Force Diversity: The Good, the Bad, and the
Reality, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 263 (Gerald R. Ferris et
al. eds. 1995).
320 See, e.g., H. John Bernardin et al., Performance Appraisal Design, Development,
and Implementation, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 462 (Gerald
R. Ferris et al. eds. 1995).
321 See, e.g., Barry Gerhart et al., Employee Compensation: Theory, Practice, and
Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 528 (Gerald R. Ferris et
al. eds. 1995); Stephen E. Condrey et al., Compensation: Choosing and Using the
Best System for Your Organization, in HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 421 (Ronald R. Sims ed.
2007).
322 See, e.g., Robert C. Liden & Thomas Tewksbury, Empowerment and Work Teams,
in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 386 (Gerald R. Ferris et al. eds.
1995); Michael P. Leiter, Engagement at Work: Issues for Measurement and
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in which HR professionals sought to improve the company’s treatment
of its workers and sought to adapt their businesses to changes in laws
and social norms.323 By working on the front lines, HR professionals
have the most direct impact on the day-to-day compliance of the
corporation.324 Even skeptics recognize that HR can deliver important
changes to workplace policies and culture—changes that may prevent
wrongs from happening in the first place.325
How do we reconcile the potential benefits from HR with the
potential hazards? To some extent, we cannot. HR must work with
management to make the company profitable, but at the same time
must be able to restrain management in order to secure legal
compliance and promote investments in human capital.326 These polar
attractions—the pull of management on one side, and legal and
professional obligations on the other—are often found in the
professions.327 There are particularly exacerbated in a youthful, less
traditional profession such as human resources.

Intervention, in THE HUMAN RESOURCES REVOLUTION: WHY PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST
MATTERS 213 (Ronald J. Burke & Cary L. Cooper eds., 2006).
323 See Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 147 (arguing that human resources have found
themselves “in relatively powerful positions” when outside forces such as labor
shortages or new laws create uncertainty in the external environment); Bisom-Rapp,
supra note SBREREP, at 9-10 (“Responding opportunistically to the changing legal
landscape, human resources managers began arguing in the 1970s that employers
must upgrade personnel procedures.”).
324 See CHERRINGTON, supra note DJC1995, at 8-11 (discussing the relationship
between human resources and line management); id. at 11-15 (reviewing the primary
HR functions).
325 See Bisom-Rapp, supra note SBREREP, at 11 (discussing research that the formal
promotion mechanisms improved managerial perspectives on disadvantaged groups);
Grossman, supra note JLG, at 49 (discussing antiharassment training as “a
worthwhile subject of study and probably a worthwhile pursuit for employers”).
326 See Jacoby, supra note SJ2003, at 148 (discussing the “ambiguous role” played by
HR within a company).
327 Many commentators raised serious concerns over the roles of professional
gatekeepers in the wake of the Enron collapse. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms , 84
B.U. L. Rev. 301, 302 (2004) (“Securities markets have long employed
“gatekeepers”—independent professionals who pledge their reputational capital—to
protect the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action. . .
. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly failed, and a unique
concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving the common denominator of
accounting irregularities.”).
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The Supreme Court’s opinions in this area, as we have explored,
display a solicitousness toward the human resources perspective on
these workplace issues. Like HR more generally, this perspective is
aligned with management. However, the Court has also recognized
that for HR to be a viable entity within the firm, it must have its own
center of gravity. Thus, the Court has been particularly protective of
retaliation claims, since such claims strike at the root of the HR
process. Similarly, in Ricci, the Court pushed for the HR professionals
to stick to their guns, even when management wanted the flexibility to
depart from the test.328 The Supreme Court has thus shown a
willingness to promote HR ideals, rather than just managerial
interests. This aspect of the Court’s employment law jurisprudence is
underappreciated.
Just as Miller has argued that progressive criminal law scholars
need a positive theory of policing,329 I would argue that progressive
employment law academics and litigators need a positive theory of
human resources. Such a theory would seek to mobilize a workforce
almost a million strong to ensure not only that employers are following
the law, but that workers are empowered to achieve their fullest
potential. Fortunately, we need not start from scratch. Many human
resources academics have attempted to push the field more in the
direction of employees330 or more in the direction of a ethics-based
practice.331 The ultimate question for the field of human resources will
be: does it have a primary commitment to management control and
discretion over personnel matters, or does it have a primary
commitment to the profession and its ethics? Legal scholars and
practitioners will continue to play an important role in this debate.

See Part II.A supra.
Miller, supra note EM1, at 76-77.
330 See, e.g., Graham & Tarbell, supra note GT2006 (advocating for a more employee328
329

oriented approach to human resources).
331 The Society for Human Resources Management has a Code of Ethics that
recognizes “As human resource professionals, we are ethically responsible for
promoting and fostering fairness and justice for all employees and their
organizations.” However, the Code also states: “As HR professionals, we are
responsible for adding value to the organizations we serve and contributing to the
ethical success of those organizations.” See SHRM Code of Ethics, at:
http://www.shrm.org/about/Pages/code-of-ethics.aspx.
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CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court is only seven years old, but if past history is
any guide, its impact on the law has only just begun. In the area of
employment law, the Court has evinced an interest in and sympathy
towards those workers who toil in the fields of human relations.
Rather than writing off this effort as simply conservative or probusiness or anti-litigation, commentators and advocates should
reconsider the place of human resources departments in the ecosystem
of the workplace. The opportunity is there to engage with these
employees and harness their industry and efficiency for positive
purposes. We should join the Court in these efforts.

